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PROVOCATION AT FACE VALUE 
KYRON HUIGENS* 
To take provocation at face value is to plead and prove it as a 
manslaughter offense, as it is defined in most criminal codes.  To do this 
seems to be both unnecessary and impossible.  The defendant has the best 
access to evidence of provocation and will benefit from the proof of this 
partial defense, so why should he not be required to prove it?  The 
prosecution has no incentive to prove provocation manslaughter because 
the definition of this offense includes a murder.  Why would the 
prosecution, having proved a murder, set out to prove a lesser crime than 
the crime for which it already has a conviction?  However, this Article will 
demonstrate that normative theory obligates us to treat provocation 
manslaughter as an offense, and that it is possible to do this as a practical 
matter. 
The argument is a conceptual argument in the normative theory of 
punishment.  The best theoretical description of provocation 
manslaughter is as an offense, and not as a partial justification defense or 
as a partial excuse premised on a partial loss of responsible agency.  Once 
we distinguish three things that are usually conflated—intentions, 
intentional actions, and intent elements—we can see that provocation 
manslaughter depends on proof of a particular intentional act of killing, 
and that this proof brings a particular set of the defendant’s intentions to 
the fore for purposes of determining his desert for punishment.  This set 
of intentions is different from the set of intentions that proof of a killing 
with intent, murder, brings to the fore for purposes of determining desert.  
Regardless of any reference to an intent to kill in the definition of 
provocation manslaughter, this kind of manslaughter is logically and 
 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
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normatively different from, and exclusive of, murder—in just the same 
way that reckless manslaughter is.  If reckless manslaughter is an offense, 
then provocation manslaughter is an offense as well—and should be 
proved as one—because there is no conceptual difference between the two 
kinds of manslaughter, relative to the other homicides. 
This Article shows how we can treat provocation manslaughter as an 
offense as a practical matter.  We should adopt a set of rules that provide 
discovery to the prosecution, that obligate it to make a prima facie case on 
pain of a mistrial and bar to reprosecution, and that reverse the ordinary 
order of jury deliberations so that provocation manslaughter is 
considered first and murder is considered second—or not at all, if the jury 
has convicted the defendant of provocation manslaughter.  These rules 
will provide an incentive for the prosecution to prove provocation 
manslaughter and a disincentive to sandbagging that proof in an attempt 
to obtain a murder conviction instead.  More importantly, the proposed 
rules enable us to live up to our rule of law ideals—including the principle 
of lenity as well as the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt—
in a way that treating provocation as a partial defense does not.  If we take 
provocation at face value, then we can better preserve criminal law’s 
constitutional principles, theoretical consistency, and moral integrity. 
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b.  Provocation Manslaughter and Normative 
Legal Theory .................................................................. 466 
2.  Regarding the Burden of Production ................................ 468 
V.  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 472 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Provocation is criminal law’s trickster.1  It appears in the form of 
something that it cannot be.  In modern codes and in the common law of 
crime, it is defined as a kind of manslaughter.2  Before this crime 
becomes manslaughter, it is murder in the simplest core sense—an 
intentional killing—and the state must prove the murder before it can 
prove the manslaughter.3  As with other offenses, the prosecution is 
required to prove provocation manslaughter beyond a reasonable 
doubt;4 and, as with other offenses, the prosecution is permitted to 
undertake this burden of persuasion only after it has met a burden of 
production.5  It might seem that, having proved a murder, the 
prosecution would have no difficulty making a prima facie case of 
manslaughter.  We must bear in mind, however, that the prosecution 
will also have to present evidence that the defendant was provoked, 
acted in the heat of passion, or was under the influence of an extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance.6  The prosecution will have to do more 
 
1. The trickster is a figure in the mythology of many cultures.  He uses deception, 
including shape shifting, in order to undermine authority, to impart wisdom, or simply to act 
maliciously.  See KIMBERLY A. CHRISTEN, CLOWNS & TRICKSTERS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
TRADITION AND CULTURE 186 (1998). 
2. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691–92 (1975); MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 210.3(1)(b) (1980); Catherine Elliot, The Partial Defence of Provocation: The House of 
Lords Decision in Smith, 64 J. CRIM. L. 594, 595–96 (2000). 
3. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691, 694. 
4. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that the prosecution bears a 
burden of persuasion of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on all essential elements of a 
criminal offense, including juvenile offenses). 
5. Cf. U.S. v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 327 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“If the 
Government sought to prosecute proposals about extant images as attempts, it would seek to 
carry its burden of showing that real children were depicted in the image subject to the 
proposal simply by introducing the image into evidence; if the figures in the picture looked 
like real children, the Government would have made its prima facie demonstration on that 
element.”). 
6. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 684–85 (“The State of Maine requires a defendant charged 
with murder to prove that he acted ‘in the heat of passion on sudden provocation’ in order to 
reduce the homicide to manslaughter.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Girouard v. 
State, 583 A.2d 718, 720 (Md. 1991) (noting types of provocation traditionally sufficient to 
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than prove a murder if it expects to convict the defendant of 
manslaughter.7 
If we take provocation at face value, then this is what we get.  None 
of it makes sense from the perspective of either the prosecution or the 
defense.  If the prosecution were to fail to prove the provocation 
manslaughter, then the proven murder would be revived; or, if the 
prosecution failed to make a prima facie case for provocation 
manslaughter, then the case for murder would be left standing.  Under 
these circumstances, no matter how principled the prosecution might be, 
it is too much to expect it to make an effective case for provocation 
manslaughter.  It simply has no incentive to do so.  Given this fact, the 
rational defendant would want to take the burden of persuasion from 
the prosecution.  And given the fact that the prosecution’s having the 
burden of persuasion on provocation is so counterintuitive—the 
defendant holds the relevant evidence,8 the defendant will benefit from 
its being proved,9 and the prosecution would be trying to obtain less 
than it already has10—there seems to be no reason to deny this wish. 
This is, of course, the direction that provocation doctrine has taken.  
The traditional rule for proof of provocation provided that the malice 
inherent in murder is negated by provoking circumstances.11  From a 
very early date, courts held that the negation of malice was for the 
defendant to prove, by a preponderance.12  The implication of this rule, 
 
reduce murder to manslaughter, including “mutual combat . . . or the sudden discovery of a 
spouse’s adultery” (emphasis added)); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1980) (“Criminal 
homicide constitutes manslaughter when . . . a homicide which would otherwise be murder is 
committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is 
reasonable explanation or excuse.” (emphasis added)). 
7. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704. 
8. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233–34 (1975) (defining the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as protection against an individual’s inner 
thoughts and feelings). 
9. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(2) (1980) (reducing the punishment for 
manslaughter to a second degree felony). 
10. See id. § 210.2. 
11. See Rollin M. Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 
544 (1934) (“Moreover, the patent rolls of Henry III point to [the negation of malice] as a 
common formula in pardons granted in the 1200’s to those who had committed homicide by 
misadventure, in self-defense or while of unsound mind.”). 
12. Id. at 551 (“It has sometimes been said that every homicide is presumed to be with 
malice aforethought and that it devolves upon the prisoner to prove circumstances which will 
justify, excuse or mitigate the act.”). 
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however, is that the defendant must disprove an element of murder.13  If 
a crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution, 
then this traditional rule shifts the burden of persuasion to the defense; 
or, more precisely, increases the quantum of evidence demanded of the 
defendant from the modest amount required to raise a reasonable doubt 
to the substantial amount required to prove a fact by a preponderance.14  
In Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court declared the traditional rules 
of proof unconstitutional for just these reasons.15 
The response to the Court’s decision in Mullaney was to redefine the 
elements of this kind of manslaughter so that they operate 
independently of the definition of murder.16  Under the Model Penal 
Code, a purpose to kill is not negated by a finding that the defendant 
caused death under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance.17  The latter facts constitute a stand-alone defense that the 
defendant is required to prove by a preponderance.18  The Supreme 
Court has endorsed this way of proving provocation manslaughter 
because the prosecution is still required to prove all elements of murder 
beyond a reasonable doubt.19 
This modern version of provocation manslaughter solves both the 
incentive problem and the constitutional problem that doomed its 
predecessor.  The burden of persuasion has been shifted to the party 
who has the incentive and means to prove the offense, which now, of 
course, becomes a partial defense.  This shift is unconstitutional if the 
elements of murder and the provocation defense complement one 
another in such a way that the proof of one disproves the other.  After 
all, the burden of persuasion on provocation—like the burden to prove 
murder—cannot be assigned to the defendant.20  However, the elements 
of provocation manslaughter can be assigned to the defense for proof, 
since they do not affect the elements of murder, and vice-versa.  
 
13. See id. (“[T]he defendant [has] the burden of going forward with the evidence [that 
proves the killing was done without malice]. . . .  If no such evidence is offered, a conviction of 
murder is proper because of the ‘presumed malice.’”). 
14. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702–04 & n.31 (1975). 
15. Id. at 703–04. 
16. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 198–99 (1977). 
17. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1980). 
18. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 198 n.2 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20 (McKinney 1975)). 
19. Id. at 208–09. 
20. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 702. 
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Provocation’s transformation from offense to defense is complete.21  Its 
continued placement among the homicide offenses is a formal 
anomaly—one that has a clear historical explanation and ample 
justification. 
What could be wrong with this brilliant arrangement?  Several 
things.  First, while we may be past the point at which this is possible, we 
ought to find it disturbing to scan the homicide offenses and to find that 
one of them is not subject to the constitutional requirement of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Supreme Court’s decision establishing 
this level of proof is one of the few decisions to which the Court has 
given retroactive effect—the reason being that the principle is so 
fundamental to constitutional law that the new decision is no more than 
a nominal recognition of an old rule.22  Where such a fundamental 
principle is concerned, however, we ought to be especially vigilant for 
evasion where there ought to have been compliance.  The Court’s test 
for this particular evasion of Due Process is to ask whether the tail wags 
the dog.23  This metaphorical standard is vague, to say the least, but if 
anything should count as wagging the dog, it would be the 
transformation of an offense into a defense by means of a change in 
wording. 
 
21. This is an ahistorical way of putting things, given that the burden of persuasion had 
been shifted to the defendant and the doctrine had been described as a defense long before 
the Supreme Court decided Patterson and long before the Model Penal Code’s authors 
drafted their version of provocation manslaughter.  At both of these junctures, however, 
provocation might have been re-conceptualized as an offense.  As unlikely as this choice 
might have been as a matter of history—it is not clear that it was ever recognized, let alone 
considered—it was, theoretically, available.  I adopt this theoretical choice as my starting 
point for purposes of exposition because my argument is theoretical and normative, not 
historical. 
22. Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 204–05 (1972) (per curiam) (“Winship 
expressly held that the reasonable doubt standard ‘is a prime instrument for reducing the risk 
of convictions resting on factual error.  The standard provides concrete substance for the 
presumption of innocence—that bedrock “axiomatic and elementary” principle whose 
“enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law[.]” . . .’  Plainly, 
then, the major purpose of the constitutional standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
announced in Winship was to overcome an aspect of a criminal trial that substantially impairs 
the truth-finding function, and Winship is thus to be given complete retroactive effect.” 
(quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970))). 
23. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87–89 (1986) (upholding a Pennsylvania 
mandatory minimum sentence statute against a due process challenge under Winship and 
Mullaney, in part because it gave “no impression of having been tailored to permit the visible 
possession finding [on a sentencing factor] to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive 
offense”). 
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Second, it is odd that there is a problem of appearances at all.  The 
perverse incentives of provocation manslaughter drove it into the 
category of defenses a long time ago, and the solution to these incentive 
problems has twice required the attention of the Supreme Court.24  At 
some point, would it not have been simpler to explicitly redefine 
provocation so that it is what everyone supposes it to be?  One would 
think so, but this has never been done. 
Third, the best time to redefine provocation would have been during 
the deliberate, centralized, and decades-long effort to draft the Model 
Penal Code.25  Mysteriously, the drafters of the Model Penal Code failed 
to do so.  In fact, they embedded provocation manslaughter even more 
securely within the structure of homicide definitions.26 
Institutional inertia probably accounts for the failure to revise the 
homicide definitions.  The real question is why we are so comfortable 
with this inertia—so comfortable, it seems, that we do not see the 
problem at all.  One possible explanation for our complacency is the 
motive behind my argument: we would prefer to treat provocation 
manslaughter as an offense, if only we could find a viable way to do so. 
The day-into-night transformation of provocation manslaughter 
from an offense to a defense raises a normative question that courts and 
scholars have not begun to consider.  In mitigating a murder to a 
 
24. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 684–85; Patterson, 432 U.S. at 198. 
25. For a brief history of the Model Penal Code, see Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. 
Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 
320–25 (2007). 
26. In the Model Penal Code, murder, like manslaughter, is defined in the alternative, 
using an intentional-state and a hybrid intentional-state or objective-circumstances fault 
criteria, respectively.  A murder is a killing done purposely or knowingly.  MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 210.2(1)(a) (1980).  As an alternative, a murder is a killing done recklessly with 
extreme indifference to the value of human life: a hybrid intentional-state or objective-
circumstances fault criterion.  Id. § 210.2(1)(b).  This set of alternative definitions of murder 
resembles the alternative definitions of manslaughter.  Manslaughter is a killing done 
recklessly.  Id. § 210.3(1)(a).  As an alternative, manslaughter is a killing done intentionally 
while under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  Id. § 210.3(1)(b).  In 
fact, the four definitions are not merely similar; they are symmetrically complementary.  A 
reckless killing that would otherwise be manslaughter is promoted to murder based on the 
objective-circumstances criterion of an extreme indifference to human life.  A purposeful or 
knowing killing that would otherwise be murder is demoted to manslaughter based on the 
objective-circumstances fault criterion of a mental or emotional disturbance for which there is 
reasonable explanation or excuse.  From this perspective, the “defense” of provocation 
assimilates into the “offense” definitions of homicide.  No “partial excuse” of provocation 
remains. 
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manslaughter on the ground that the defendant was affected by a 
distressing situation, provocation doctrine sets the grade of an offense.  
This task concerns the core requirement of just punishment: fault in 
criminal wrongdoing and the concomitant desert for legal punishment.27  
The normative logic behind provocation manslaughter is that one who 
kills under provoking circumstances does not seem to deserve 
punishment for the worst homicide.28  By designating provocation 
manslaughter a defense and altering its elements to meet constitutional 
demands, we have changed the formal expression of this norm without 
changing its logic.  The doctrine still serves to grade a homicide.  Given 
the centrality and gravity of the task of defining and grading homicides, 
the fact that this transformation has been effected so easily is suspect. 
This point seems perverse.  Why should any of this be hard?  After 
all, we have a free hand to design criminal law as society’s needs and 
demands require.  If the practical and constitutional difficulties involved 
in taking provocation at face value necessitate our treating it as a 
defense instead of an offense, then so be it.  We can say it so to make it 
so.  This way of dealing with provocation manslaughter seems benign, 
but it is not.  The problem is precisely the ease with which we do it.  If 
we retain the normative logic of provocation manslaughter but change 
the form it takes in criminal law, then we make a murder a manslaughter 
by stipulation.  This is an appalling thing to do. 
Now, the stipulation I have in mind is a stipulation in the normative 
theory of legal punishment, and not a legal stipulation made in an actual 
criminal case.  It is not as if the prosecution and defense would ever 
stipulate that one crime instead of another crime has been done.  Even a 
plea bargain has more substance to it than that.  Nevertheless, the 
morality of legal stipulations sheds some light on the morality of 
theoretical stipulations.29  Punishment theory is, after all, normative legal 
theory, and it is impossible, in the end, to separate one kind of 
stipulation from the other. 
Generally speaking, legal adversaries stipulate to things that are 
peripheral and unimportant.  A stipulation skips over the hard parts.  It 
 
27. See HERBERT MORRIS, Persons and Punishment, in ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: 
ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 31, 41 (1976). 
28. See Kyron Huigens, The Continuity of Justification Defenses, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 
627, 640–41. 
29. See id. at 629. 
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grants a conclusion for the sake of argument, and then releases everyone 
concerned from the obligation to make an argument.  A legal stipulation 
that a manslaughter, and not a murder, has been committed would 
dishonor the victim and fail to accord the offender the respect implicit in 
a careful consideration of his actions and his fate.  The proof of 
provocation may be the most intense, high-stakes moment in a homicide 
trial.  The defendant tries to persuade a jury that he did not commit 
murder, which involves the risky move, to say the least, of admitting that 
he did.  No one can fail to appreciate the gravity of his situation.  This 
gamble could cost the defendant decades of his life, or all of it.  The 
significance of this part of the case is not lost on anyone, least of all the 
victim’s survivors.  And from their perspective, none of this risk and 
significance is appreciably lessened in a plea bargain. 
The problem with the theoretical stipulation that provocation is a 
defense instead of an offense is that, before anything has been set in 
motion in any actual case, all of this social, moral, and emotional freight 
has been handled carelessly.  The situation is no less grave than it is in 
any other homicide prosecution, and yet in those cases this gravity is 
reflected in the imposition of a demanding burden of persuasion on the 
government.30  The prosecution must prove murder, reckless 
manslaughter, and negligent homicide beyond a reasonable doubt.  Not 
to impose this burden on the prosecution in a case of provocation 
manslaughter is to take provocation cases too lightly.  This theoretical 
stipulation fails to accord the defendant the proper kind and degree of 
respect, even if we have benevolent motives.31  It would be better, if at 
all possible, to prove provocation manslaughter in the way that we prove 
 
30. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that the prosecution bears a 
burden of persuasion of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on all essential elements of a 
criminal offense, including juvenile offenses). 
31. The literature on legal punishment and a due regard for the human dignity of the 
offender, including his right to be punished, is extensive and distinguished.  See, e.g., MORRIS, 
supra note 27, at 41 (“In our system of punishment an attempt was made to maximize each 
individual’s freedom of choice by first of all delimiting by rules certain spheres of conduct 
immune from interference by others.  The punishment associated with these primary rules 
paid deference to an individual’s free choice by connecting punishment to a freely chosen act 
violative of the rules, thus giving some plausibility to the claim . . . that what a person received 
by way of punishment he himself had chosen.”); Markus Dirk Dubber, The Right to Be 
Punished: Autonomy and Its Demise in Modern Penal Thought, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 113, 
115–16 (1998); Martin R. Gardner, The Right to Be Punished—A Suggested Constitutional 
Theory, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 838, 839–46 (1981); Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as 
Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1829–30 (1999). 
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other forms of homicide. 
Aside from this moral misstep, the treatment of provocation 
manslaughter as a defense is just odd.  On the face of it, to convert an 
offense into a defense must be the least likely solution to any doctrinal 
problem in any body of law.  What remedy could be more extreme?  
And yet, given the scope of the practical and constitutional problems 
presented by provocation manslaughter, we decided that this extreme 
solution was justified.32  Perhaps it was; it might have seemed that we 
had no alternative. 
But in fact we had an alternative.  We might have tried to think 
through the problem from the opposite direction.  We might have tried 
to keep provocation manslaughter in place as a homicide offense, 
making the necessary alterations elsewhere in law and legal theory.  We 
chose not to work this hard.  Instead, we merely declared that an offense 
would be a defense henceforth, stipulating away the normative 
complexity of the problem.33 
This Article tries to do the work required to avoid this objectionable 
move.  Ultimately, the principal obstacles to taking provocation at face 
value are the extreme measures required to do so.  The prosecution’s 
proof of murder must be extinguished if a prima facie case of 
provocation manslaughter has been made, so that a murder conviction is 
precluded thereafter.  Furthermore, it must be up to the prosecution to 
make this prima facie case, just as it does for other offenses.  In other 
words, homicide law must be reconfigured so that provocation 
manslaughter is the only viable case of homicide the prosecution can 
pursue if the facts show a homicide committed under provoking 
circumstances. 
This reconfiguration of homicide law is the subject of Part IV of this 
Article.  The necessary preclusion of a conviction for murder can be 
accomplished by inverting the normal course of jury deliberations, with 
the following procedure.  In a prosecution for murder, the prosecution is 
required to raise a prima facie case of provocation manslaughter if 
sufficient evidence of this offense is available to it.  If the prosecution has 
 
32. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977). 
33. To reiterate a point I previously made, supra note 21, this is a deliberately ahistorical 
statement.  It is simply a way of describing a choice not made by the Model Penal Code 
drafters or the Supreme Court, regardless of whether they made a deliberate choice not to 
frame provocation manslaughter, explicitly and unambiguously, as an offense. 
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made a prima facie case of provocation manslaughter, then the jury 
should be instructed to consider this charge before it considers the charge 
of murder.  If the jury convicts the defendant of provocation 
manslaughter, then it should cease deliberating and issue a verdict finding 
the defendant guilty of that crime.  If the jury acquits the defendant of 
provocation manslaughter, or if it fails to reach a verdict on that crime, 
then it should proceed to consider and decide whether the defendant 
committed murder. 
 One obvious question is, When is sufficient evidence of provocation 
available to the prosecution?  Another procedural rule answers this 
question.  The defense may invoke the special order of proof for 
provocation manslaughter in a motion at the end of the state’s case.  Its 
right to make this motion, however, is conditioned on its providing pre-
trial notice of its intention to make the motion and on the disclosure to the 
prosecution of all evidence of provocation in its possession when the 
notice is given, and thereafter. 
This inversion of ordinary proof procedures might appear radical, 
but if we are willing to accept that something defined as an offense can 
justly be treated as a defense, then the ship that quarantined 
unacceptably radical solutions to the problem has already sailed.  In a 
more serious vein, everyone concerned with the problem agrees that 
there is something about provocation manslaughter that distinguishes it 
from other homicide offenses, as evidenced by the perverse incentives 
that arise if we require the prosecution to prove it in the same way that 
it proves the other homicides.  At the most fundamental level, the 
correct normative-theoretical description of provocation 
manslaughter—that is, its description as a feature of just punishment—is 
at odds with the practicalities of criminal prosecutions under current 
constitutional and court rules. 
For the moment, I am not concerned with when, how, or why this 
happened.  My argument is that provocation manslaughter is an offense 
as a conceptual matter, and my working assumption is that we are 
committed to abiding by the constitutional principle of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The accepted solution to this conflict between theory 
and practice is to convert provocation manslaughter into a defense, 
which I take to be nothing more than a work-around measure that fails 
to comply with Winship.  The inverted proof procedure that I propose is 
actually a less radical solution to these difficulties, and it far better 
preserves criminal law’s constitutional principles, theoretical 
consistency, and moral integrity. 
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Parts II and III of this Article lay out the premises of the proposal in 
anticipation of its defense in Part IV.  The analysis is not historical or 
doctrinal.  I will be making conceptual arguments characteristic of the 
normative theory of just punishment.34 
In Part II, I will argue that provocation is an offense because it is 
unlike either of the two acknowledged categories of legal defense.  First, 
it is not a claim of non-responsible agency—the kind of defense that 
American courts and scholars call an excuse.35  Even if we assume that a 
provoked actor is partially incapacitated, we have no reason to think 
that criminal law treats this incapacitation in the way that it does 
incapacitation by mental illness, minority, or duress.  Just punishment in 
response to offenses committed because of these incapacitating 
conditions consists of no punishment at all.36  Regardless of whether any 
moral theory or morality-based jurisprudence requires us to refrain 
from imposing legal punishment in these cases, a civilized society will 
 
34. Conceptual analysis, in general, can be described this way: 
 
Our subject is really the elucidation of the possible situations covered by the words 
we use to ask our questions . . . .  I use the word “concept” partly in deference to the 
traditional terminology . . . and partly to emphasize that though our subject is the 
elucidation of the various situations covered by bits of language according to one or 
another language user, or by the folk in general, it is divorced from considerations 
local to any particular language. 
FRANK JACKSON, FROM METAPHYSICS TO ETHICS: A DEFENCE OF CONCEPTUAL 
ANALYSIS 33 (1998).  This kind of analysis does not concern a priori truths, and so is 
ultimately sociological.  See Brian Leiter, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The 
Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 43–51 (2003).  Some theories of 
law purport to show that the content of law is determined by morality, and these are in one 
sense normative theories of law.  See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 1, 7 (1986); 
Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 
953–54, 995 (1988).  The theory of legal punishment as it is ordinarily practiced is normative 
in a different sense.  It assumes not only that its descriptions of criminal law ought to be 
adopted as positive law, but also that this is so because a correct description of legal 
punishment is a description of just punishment.  This is so, in turn, because justice is in some 
way immanent in legal punishment.  For example, one classic argument made against a 
utilitarian theory of punishment is that it is descriptively false because it immorally authorizes 
scapegoating.  We assume that if a punishment theory describes unjust punishment as just, 
then it has failed to describe legal punishment correctly.  See Kyron Huigens, Implicitly 
Normative Punishment Theory, (draft book chapter on file with law review), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1807523. 
35. See infra note 104. 
36. See MORRIS, supra note 27, at 49. 
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refrain from doing so.37  A legal non-responsibility defense is a legal 
prescription that, from the point of view of morality, is supererogatory 
(in duty-based morality)38 or virtuous (in virtue ethics).39  Not even 
justice requires us to recognize non-responsibility defenses, but we are a 
better society if we do so.  We perform morally supererogatory or 
virtuous acts out of kindness, generosity, or grace.  It is not plausible to 
view provocation manslaughter as this kind of act.  Provocation might 
look similar to insanity in that there is a loss of rational capacity, but it is 
fundamentally different with respect to what we do about that 
incapacity.  Because of this difference, provocation is not a defense of 
non-responsibility.  
Second, provocation is not a justification defense.  The Supreme 
Court has addressed the law of provocation manslaughter twice, both 
times on the subject of the procedures for its proof.40   
Remarkably, to prove provocation in the way that we prove 
justification defenses would have obviated all of these difficulties.  This 
could be taken as a reason to think that provocation is a justification for 
homicide, conceptually speaking.  This suggestion, however, is quickly 
dispelled.  Provocation is not a justification defense because it does not 
function in the way that justification defenses do.   
The law of justification defenses is unsettled, and the controversy 
concerns attributes of legal justification that simply are not part of 
provocation doctrine.  The principal conceptions of legal justification 
spar over the proper arrangement of fact and fault elements in the proof 
of the defense.41  Does a legal justification require only a belief that one 
 
37. See id. at 49–50. 
38. “Supererogation is the technical term for the class of actions that go ‘beyond the call 
of duty.’  Roughly speaking, supererogatory acts are morally good although not (strictly) 
required.”  See David Heyd, Supererogation, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/ 
supererogation/. 
39. “[Virtue ethics] may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or 
moral character, in contrast to the approach which emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or 
that which emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism).”  Rosalind 
Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta 
ed., 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/ethics-virtue/. 
40. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 198 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 
684, 684–85 (1975). 
41. See Huigens, supra note 28, at 644–64, 684–91. 
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is justified (the position of the Model Penal Code);42 both a belief and 
actual justification (a position known as the Dadson view);43 or either a 
belief or actual justification (the negative elements view)?44  This 
controversy is orthogonal to provocation doctrine.  The provoked actor 
is exculpated, if at all, because of his response to provoking 
circumstances, not because he has a particular belief about them.  In any 
event, from the perspective of mistake, the two defenses are clearly 
distinguishable.  When we acquit one who is mistaken about having a 
justification, we acquit because he acted as he would not have done 
absent the mistake.45  In contrast, when we acquit one who is mistaken 
about provoking circumstances, we acquit him because he has acted as 
he would have done had he not been mistaken. 
I will argue in Part III that provocation is an offense.  A murder 
conviction should be cabined—not barred, but strongly circumscribed in 
the way I propose—because even though a case for provocation 
manslaughter does not deny that an intentional killing has occurred, it 
does deny that a murder has occurred.  This is far from obvious—in fact, 
it seems obviously wrong—because of the way the elements of murder 
and manslaughter align.  In the Model Penal Code’s formulation, 
murder explicitly is made an included element of provocation 
manslaughter.46  More generally, a murder is an intentional killing, and it 
is an inescapable feature of provocation manslaughter that provoked 
killers intend to kill their victims.47  However, consider the common law 
of crime formulation.  A murder was defined as a killing with malice, 
and provocation was said to negate this malice, resulting in a 
manslaughter.  This definition of provocation manslaughter did not 
include murder; it expressly excluded murder. 
Part of my objective is to recover this way of looking at provocation 
manslaughter within the modern scheme of homicide definitions.  If a 
homicide is committed recklessly, then murder is not a viable charge.  A 
 
42. Id. at 659–60. 
43. Id. at 654–55. 
44. Id. at 654. 
45. Id. at 630. 
46. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1980) (“Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter when . . . a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable 
explanation or excuse.”). 
47. See id. 
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reckless killing is not an intentional killing.  The key to my argument is 
to recognize that provocation manslaughter works the same way.  Proof 
of provocation manslaughter necessarily precludes proof of murder.  
Recklessness and purpose are criteria of criminal fault.48  Furthermore, 
they are both one kind of fault criterion—the kind that describes the 
subjective state of the actor when he is engaged in criminal wrongdoing.  
A second kind of fault criterion consists of the objective circumstances 
of the wrongdoing.  Provoking circumstances constitute this kind of fault 
criterion, and provocation manslaughter is defined by reference to it, 
just as reckless manslaughter is defined by reference to a subjective-
states criterion.  I will argue that subjective-states fault criteria have no 
conceptual or normative priority over objective-circumstances criteria.  
Intentional killing under provoking circumstances constitutes an 
integrated fault criterion that is logically inconsistent with the intent to 
kill that defines murder.  A provoked homicide can no more be a 
murder than a reckless homicide can be. 
The critical part of this argument about criminal fault criteria is a 
three-way distinction between intentions, intentional actions, and intent 
elements of offenses.  Desert for legal punishment depends on one’s 
intentions.  An intention lies behind an intentional action, obviously, but 
what is less obvious is this: any number of intentions might lie behind an 
intentional action.  An intent element in an offense definition seems to 
describe the intention relevant to desert directly, but it actually cannot 
do so.  Intent elements in offense definitions describe intentional 
actions, but not the intentions that constitute criminal fault.  Just as 
many intentions lie behind an intentional action, many intentions are 
relevant to one’s desert for punishment for a crime that consists of such 
an intentional action. 
This is why subjective-states fault criteria—such as purpose, 
knowledge, or advertent recklessness—do not have conceptual or 
normative primacy over objective-circumstances fault criteria.  
Objective-circumstances fault elements, such as negligence and malice, 
describe intentional actions as well as, if not better than, subjective-
states fault criteria do.  They bring the defendant’s relevant intentions, 
beyond the simple intention so to act, to the fore for purposes of 
adjudicating his desert for punishment. 
 
48. See id. § 210.2(1). 
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Provoking circumstances, even when they are described by reference 
to a subjective disturbance experienced by the defendant, are objective-
circumstances fault elements.  They operate in a manner that is strictly 
analogous to recklessness—the subjective-states fault criterion featured 
in the other kind of manslaughter.  Like recklessness, provoking 
circumstances bring the relevant intentions of the defendant to the fore 
in the adjudication of his desert for punishment.  Because provocation 
manslaughter is, in this central respect, conceptually indistinguishable 
from reckless manslaughter, it, too, should be pled and proved as an 
offense.  In other words, we should take provocation at face value. 
II.  WHY PROVOCATION IS NOT A DEFENSE 
My argument that provocation manslaughter is an offense obviously 
conflicts with the two leading explanations of the nature of the offense: 
the claim that it is a partial excuse (a claim of partial non-responsible 
agency) and the claim that it is a partial justification defense.49  While I 
would prefer to move immediately to a defense of my main thesis, it 
seems imperative to say something about these two rival conceptions of 
provocation, one of which is, overwhelmingly, the consensus view.50  
Fortunately, this exercise will bring out some points that are useful in 
the development of the thesis that the criminal fault in provocation 
manslaughter is logically inconsistent with the criminal fault of murder, 
so that a conviction of the former offense necessarily bars a conviction 
for the latter offense. 
 
49. Other writers have dissented from the “excuse or justification” dichotomy.  See, e.g., 
Stephen P. Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1677, 1726–27 (2005) (advancing a 
virtue ethics-based theory of provocation as akrasia—the lack of affective, as opposed to 
merely cognitive, knowledge of the good); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two 
Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 315–16 (1996) (advancing 
a virtue ethics-based theory of provocation, to wit, “[t]he existence of passion demonstrates 
that the offender values the good (which, of course, must be something that a person of good 
character would value) sufficiently in relation to other goods”); Victoria Nourse, Passion’s 
Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1394–99 
(1997) (describing provocation as a hybrid doctrine of “warranted excuse”).  My view is 
closest to those of Kahan and Nussbaum, and Garvey, in that it is also a virtue ethics-based 
theory. 
50. Reid Griffith Fontaine, Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as Excuse 
Not Justification, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 27, 29 (2009) (“A majority of United States 
jurisdictions recognize . . . heat of passion as an affirmative, partial defense to murder . . . .”). 
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A.  Provocation Is Not a Defense of Non-Responsible Agency 
The prevailing consensus is that provocation manslaughter depends, 
normatively, on an irrational response akin to insanity.51  The man who 
kills his wife and her lover when he finds them in bed together has, 
understandably, lost control.52  The defendant is a non-responsible agent 
to some extent, and he should be acquitted of murder to the same 
extent.53 
This analysis of provocation as a non-responsibility defense, 
however, is often incomplete.  The analysis of non-responsibility 
defenses always starts with the recognition of some kind of disability 
that has exculpating implications—incomplete moral development in 
the defense of minority;54 practical involuntariness in the duress 
defense;55 mental illness or disability in the defense of legal insanity;56 
and a similar, partial, disabling of rational capacity in the partial defense 
of provocation.57  Too often, however, the analysis of non-responsibility 
 
51. See, e.g., id. at 29–30; George Mousourakis, Reason, Passion and Self-Control: 
Understanding the Moral Basis of the Provocation Defence, 38 REVUE DE DROIT [R.D.U.S.] 
215, 219 (2008) (Fr.) (“The real basis of the provocation defense, traditionally regarded as a 
concession to human frailty, lies in the actor’s loss of self-control in circumstances in which 
any ordinary person might also have lost control.”); Christina Pei-Lin Chen, Note, 
Provocation’s Privileged Desire: The Provocation Doctrine, “Homosexual Panic,” and the 
Non-Violent Unwanted Sexual Advance Defense, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195, 205 
(2000) (“That is, successful invocation of the provocation defense today results in the partial 
excuse of heat of passion killings via a reduction in the conviction from murder to voluntary 
manslaughter.”). 
52. See Fontaine, supra note 50, at 34–35 (describing a scenario where a man’s 
reasonable interpretation of his wife’s betrayal “gives rise to [a man’s] heated killing, partially 
excusing the defendant’s crime and reducing it from murder to manslaughter”). 
53. Id. at 35. 
54. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.10(1)(a) (1985) (“A person shall not be tried for or 
convicted of an offense if . . . at the time of the conduct charged to constitute the offense he 
was less than sixteen years of age . . . .”). 
55. See id. § 2.09(1) (“It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct 
charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to 
use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, that a person of reasonable 
firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.”). 
56. See id. § 4.01(1) (“A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of 
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law.”). 
57. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1980) (“Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter when . . . a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable 
explanation or excuse.”). 
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stops there, as if it were obvious why exculpation follows from disability.  
This is not obvious, because the disability of the accused is a fact and 
exculpation is a norm—a reason why we should think that legal 
punishment is not called for.  Perhaps the absence of rational agency 
makes legal punishment immorally gratuitous because it can have no 
deterrent effect;58 or perhaps to punish a person who lacks rational 
agency when he commits a crime is to fail to treat that person with equal 
concern and respect;59 or perhaps to punish in such a case is to fail to 
treat the defendant as an end in himself.60 
None of this is very clear, however.  For one thing, to punish an 
insane actor certainly does have a deterrent effect.61  This is the effect 
contemplated by legislators in the jurisdictions in which the defense has 
been abolished.62  Abolition of the insanity defense can be expected to 
deter malingering and to send a message of zero-tolerance for crime.63  
 
58. 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 1–3, 5–6 (London, W. Pickering 1823) (1789).  Jeremy Bentham contended 
that cases of insanity were among the “Cases Unmeet for Punishment” because “punishment 
must be inefficacious.”  Id. at 2, 5–6.  In these cases, “the penal provision, though it were 
conveyed to a man’s notice, could produce no effect on him, with respect to preventing him 
from engaging in any act of the sort in question.”  Id. at 6. 
59. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (1977) (“We 
may describe a right to equality of the second kind, which Rawls says is fundamental, in this 
way.  We might say that individuals have a right to equal concern and respect in the design 
and administration of the political institutions that govern them.”). 
60. See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 54 
(Robert Paul Wolff ed., Lewis White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1969) (1785) (“The 
practical imperative, therefore, is the following: Act so that you treat humanity, whether in 
your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.”). 
61. See H.L.A. HART, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 28, 43 (1968) (“[I]t does not follow—
because the threat of punishment in his case . . . is useless—that his punishment . . . will also be 
unnecessary to maintain the efficacy of the threats for others at its highest.”). 
62. Montana, Idaho, Utah, and Kansas have abolished the insanity defense.  See Henry 
F. Fradella, From Insanity to Beyond Diminished Capacity: Mental Illness and Criminal 
Excuse in the Post-Clark Era, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 7, 34–35 (2007). 
63. See Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity 
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 621 (1989–1990) (“[T]he purported 
abuse of the insanity defense symbolizes the alleged breakdown of law and order, the 
thwarting of punishment . . ., the failure of the crime control model, and the ascendancy of a 
‘liberal,’ exculpatory, excuse-ridden jurisprudence . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); Donald H.J. 
Hermann, The Insanity Defense, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 987, 987 (1983) (reviewing WILLIAM J. 
WINSLADE & JUDITH WILSON ROSS, THE INSANITY PLEA (1983)) (“Public opinion reveals 
opposition to the insanity defense, with the view often expressed that too many criminals 
escape punishment by pleading and, in some instances, feigning insanity.” (footnotes 
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As for whether the punishment of the insane offender fails to accord 
him equal concern and respect, to say no more than this is to beg the 
question.  One is entitled to be treated with equal concern and respect 
simply because one is human.64  In general, to fail to punish the guilty 
actor is a failure to recognize his status as an autonomous member of 
the human community.65  The insane offender’s disability does not 
deprive him of this kind of autonomy, and not to punish him on the 
assumption that it does so would be to fail to treat him with equal 
concern and respect.  This leaves us still in search of some reason, 
beyond his disability, to think that to punish him would amount to this 
kind of failure. 
 Finally, it is not clear that to punish the non-responsible agent fails 
to treat the offender as an end in himself.  This categorical imperative is 
a feature of Kant’s moral theory and not of his legal theory.66  The public 
authorization of coercion follows from the principle of right, das Recht,67 
and the principle of right is notoriously demanding.68  Where legal 
punishment is concerned, mercy, in particular, is out of the question.69 
 
omitted)). 
64. See DWORKIN, supra note 59, at 182 (“We may therefore say that justice as fairness 
rests on the assumption of a natural right of all men and women to equality of concern and 
respect, a right they possess not by virtue of birth or characteristic or merit or excellence but 
simply as human beings with the capacity to make plans and give justice.”). 
65. See MORRIS, supra note 27, at 48–49 (describing the right to be punished in terms of 
a right to be treated as a person in a system that respects individual choice and equality). 
66. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 11–13 (2009) (explaining why the categorical imperative, a product of Kant’s 
ethical philosophy, cannot be applied to questions of law and government). 
67. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 472, 
487, 498–99 (1987) (describing publicly authorized coercion as a principle of right, as opposed 
to an exercise of individual virtue). 
68. In an often-quoted passage on retributive punishment, Kant wrote, 
 
Even if a civil society were to be dissolved by the consent of all its members (e.g., if 
a people inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse throughout the 
world), the last murderer remaining in prison would first have to be executed, so 
that each has done to him what his deeds deserve and blood guilt does not cling to 
the people for not having insisted upon this punishment; for otherwise the people 
can be regarded as collaborators in this public violation of justice. 
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 142 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1991) (1797). 
69. Kant writes, “Of all the rights of a sovereign, the right to grant clemency to a criminal 
. . . is the slipperiest one for him to exercise . . . .  With regard to crimes of subjects against one 
another it is absolutely not for him to exercise it; for here failure to punish . . . is the greatest 
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The best explanation for non-responsibility defenses, it seems to me, 
is that suspending punishment is a morally supererogatory act that we 
have reduced to a legal rule.  It does not matter whether punishment of 
the non-responsible agent is immoral because it does not deter; or 
whether to refrain from punishment is required by das Recht; or whether 
the right to equal concern and respect requires us not to punish.  We 
exculpate the non-responsible agent for the sake of kindness, 70 mercy,71 
grace,72 or some combination of the three.  Supererogatory acts are by 
definition not required by morality—“the quality of mercy is not 
strain’d”73—but this is not a reason to think that they cannot be required 
by legal rules.  The source of law’s validity is not morality74 but social 
 
wrong against his subjects.”  Id. at 145. 
70. “Kindness” comes from the old English “gecyndnys in sense ‘generation, nation,’” 
and has an obsolete meaning of “[k]inship; near relationship; natural affection arising from 
this.”  8 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 441 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter OED].  I use it, 
then, to refer to empathy, sympathy, and compassion, as well as in its ordinary sense: “The 
quality or habit of being kind; kind nature or disposition, or the exhibition of this in action or 
conduct.”  Id. 
71. “Mercy” is the most clearly supererogatory of the three concepts that I use to 
explain defenses of non-responsible agency.  The Latin root of “mercy” is “mercēdem” or 
“mercēs,” and “[t]he post-classical uses of mercēs are developed from the specific application 
of the word to the reward in heaven which is earned by those who have no claim, and from 
whom no requital can be expected.”  9 OED 625–26 (2d ed. 1989).  This leads to the modern 
sense of mercy: “Forbearance and compassion shown by one person to another who is in his 
power and who has no claim to receive kindness; kind and compassionate treatment in a case 
where severity is merited or expected.”  Id. at 626. 
72. “Grace” has one meaning that fits non-responsible agency defenses, as I conceive of 
them, almost perfectly: “An exceptional favour granted by someone in authority, a privilege, 
a dispensation.”  6 OED 718–19 (2d ed. 1989).  In its specifically religious sense, when used 
with reference to God, it refers to a supererogatory act: “Favour, favorable or benignant 
regard or its manifestation (now only on the part of a superior); favour or goodwill, in 
contradistinction to right or obligation, as the ground of a concession.”  Id. at 718.  I use it, 
then, to refer to forgiveness and generosity. 
73. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 4, sc. 1.  In the play, “the 
speaker[, Portia,] is telling SHYLOCK that mercy must be freely given, and is inviting him to 
show mercy to the title CHARACTER.”  E.D. HIRSCH, JR., ET AL., THE NEW DICTIONARY OF 
CULTURAL LITERACY 137 (2002). 
74. Compare  DWORKIN, supra note 59, at 14, 39–45 (arguing that legal validity rests on 
law’s integrity, which consists of fit and justification with respect to morality), with H.L.A. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 256 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing, in the book’s Postscript, that legal 
validity is determined by a rule of recognition, which is constituted by a community’s 
engaging in a certain practice with the attitude that the practice is obligatory).  Because the 
theory of non-responsibility defenses outlined above takes these defenses to be morally 
supererogatory, it is inconsistent with Dworkinian jurisprudence, which makes all legal 
defenses requirements of morality, just as all valid law is a requirement of morality. 
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practice exclusive of morality.75  As a consequence, law’s content is 
orthogonal to morality.76  We can write the law to require less or more 
than morality does.  Where non-responsibility defenses are concerned, 
we do the latter. 
Consider the duress defense.77  It is not clear whether this defense 
rests on the non-responsibility of the accused or the fact that criminal 
fault—and hence, criminal wrongdoing itself—is missing in such cases.78  
At least on the former account, however, the rationale of duress is 
kindness, in the literal sense.  We empathize with a person who has been 
put in fear for her life.  She has committed a crime—but so would we all 
have done had we been in her shoes.  And how much more kindness, in 
the form of sympathy, do we confer on the insane actor who has been 
driven into wrongdoing by beliefs that he cannot defend and 
motivations that he cannot control? 
Or perhaps the non-responsibility defenses reflect forgiveness for 
legal wrongs.  This is most clear in the defense of minority: forgiveness is 
always called for in cases of children who have done wrong.  The 
distinctive barbarity of a society that ignores human frailty, that uses lost 
souls to “send a message” in the way of heads on pikes, or that takes the 
 
75. Compare JOSEPH RAZ, Authority, Law, and Morality, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 194, 209–10 (1994) [hereinafter 
ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN] (arguing that legal authority preempts moral reasons, so 
that law’s validity cannot depend on morality), with HART, supra note 74, at 251–52 (arguing 
that the tolerable level of uncertainty in a legal system varies, so that there is no reason to 
expect the incorporation of moral principles in a rule of recognition to fatally undermine it). 
76. Nothing in legal positivism precludes law’s appealing to morality for its content, as 
opposed to its validity.  See RAZ, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, in ETHICS IN THE 
PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 75, at 310, 318 (“Rights of freedom of expression, assembly, the 
free exercise of religion, freedom of movement, privacy, non-discrimination, and others are 
typically declared in broad terms, and the courts are left free to develop legal doctrines giving 
these rights concrete content in light of sound moral considerations.”).  Criminal codes 
commonly contain terms such as “malice,” “depraved mind,” “heinous, atrocious, and cruel,” 
and “extreme indifference to the value of human life.”  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (2006) 
(including the term “malice aforethought”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1980) (including 
the phrase “extreme indifference to the value of human life”).  The moral content of these 
criteria is plain, as is that of any rule that requires finding them as a condition of a legally 
valid judgment of punishment, but nothing in legal positivism rules this out. 
77. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1985) (“It is an affirmative defense that the 
actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do 
so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, 
that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.”). 
78. See Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and 
Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1333, 1349–50 (1989). 
07 -HUIGENS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  2:01 PM 
430 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:409 
 
lives of delinquent children, lies ultimately in its refusal to enact into law 
the values of kindness, mercy, or grace in a way that would preclude 
such punishment. 
From this perspective, it is very difficult to see provocation as a non-
responsibility defense.  Is our predominant reaction to homicides 
committed under provoking circumstances one of kindness, mercy, or 
grace?  Do we sympathize with the person who has engaged in mutual 
combat and who has done so, we should bear in mind, without 
justification?  Probably not.  Most of us assume that we would have the 
sense not to wind up in such a situation.  No doubt we feel something for 
the humiliated spouse in an adulterous affair, but is this compassion or 
merely pity—or even an essentially selfish wariness about our own 
situation that is merely prompted by the defendant’s case?  An assault 
on a member of the defendant’s family draws a sympathetic reaction 
from the rest of us, and this sympathy might lead us to require a morally 
supererogatory mitigation in such cases, as a matter of law.  But would 
this be so clear without the penumbra of necessity that surrounds such 
cases?  If not, then provocation by an act of violence against a family 
member appears to be less a matter of non-responsibility and more a 
plea of justification. 
The doctrinal features of provocation bear out the suspicion that 
provocation is not a defense of non-responsibility.  It is possible, for 
example, to maintain a defense of provocation even if one was not, in 
fact, provoked.79  Is mistaken non-responsibility even a coherent idea, let 
alone a legal defense?  Many insane people are mistaken about the fact 
that they are insane because they believe that they are sane.  But this 
mistaken belief in one’s sanity is merely a feature of insanity.  To the 
extent this mistake exculpates, the reasons for exculpation collapse back 
into exculpation for insanity itself.  Conversely, suppose a defendant 
asks to be acquitted on the ground that he reasonably believed he was 
insane when he committed his crime, although, as it turns out, he was 
perfectly sane.  As a defense, this is perfectly incoherent. 
Finally, it appears that the more thoroughly the defense of 
provocation is framed in subjective terms as an emotional upset, the 
 
79. See Fontaine, supra note 50, at 33–40 (noting that cases of “adequate non-
provocation” include: (1) mistakes about the circumstances constituting the supposed 
provocation that are (a) reasonable or (b) unreasonable; and (2) otherwise good cases of 
provocation that involve the killing of a third party (a) accidentally or (b) intentionally). 
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more often it leads to morally counterintuitive, even morally offensive, 
results.80  Victoria Nourse discovered that provocation instructions have 
been given in what she called “departure cases.”81  These are cases in 
which a woman has tried to leave an abusive relationship, and in which 
the abuser killed her, a man trying to assist her, or both.82  Why did he 
do this?  Because he was very upset his woman was leaving him, of 
course.  If provocation is premised on reduced rational capacity, then it 
makes sense to give him a partial defense because of his infantile 
condition.  The problem is that this makes no moral sense at all.  It is 
grossly at odds with our assessment of such a case.  But if provocation 
turns on non-responsibility, and if the accused has lost responsible 
agency because of an emotional upset, then why would following the 
logic of the defense closely and consistently make the defense less 
sensible? 
B.  Provocation Is Not a Justification Defense 
The Supreme Court has considered provocation as a constitutional 
question twice, both times on the subject of the procedures used for its 
proof.83  In these cases and in the literature surrounding them, one thing 
has gone largely unnoticed.  A perfectly adequate model for the proof of 
provocation was available—one that would have presented no 
constitutional difficulties, and that has raised no moral or theoretical 
objections in its native habitat.  We might have proved the provocation 
defense in the same way that we prove justification defenses.  The 
procedure for proving a justification is, in fact, an excellent fit for the 
substance of the provocation “defense,” which makes it all the more 
mysterious that it has never been widely adopted.  The most likely 
explanation for this omission, it would appear, is that we are unwilling to 
tolerate the merest suggestion that provocation is itself a justification 
 
80. See Nourse, supra note 49, at 1390–94 (describing the ill effects of the Model Penal 
Code’s “extreme mental or emotional disturbance” formulation and re-conceptualizing 
provocation as a “warranted excuse”). 
81. See id. at 1352. 
82. See id. at 1351–52. 
83. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 198, 210 (1977) (holding that the burden of 
proving extreme mental or emotional disturbance may be placed on the defendant when it 
operates as an affirmative defense); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975) (holding 
that the burden of proving heat of passion may not be placed on the defendant when it is 
included in the actual offense). 
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defense. 
This unwillingness is understandable given that the normative 
argument against treating provocation as a justification defense is 
simple, persuasive, and widely accepted.  None of the reasons that count 
as adequate provocation is a morally sufficient reason to kill.84  
Provocation by mutual combat is clearly distinguishable from 
justification by self-defense—by the latter’s requirement of necessity, 
for example.85  Provocation by assault on a family member is easily 
distinguished from the justified defense of another person by, among 
other features, the latter’s including a duty to retreat where this is 
feasible.86  As for the sudden discovery of adultery, which is ordinarily 
treated as the central case of provocation,87 there are several arguments 
in the nature of justification to be made, and each of them is more 
offensive than the last.  If a husband discovers another man having sex 
with his wife, then his honor has been impugned.  Is this a good enough 
reason for the husband to kill his wife’s lover?  In a culture of honor, the 
answer to the moral question seems to be yes.88  But even in the regions 
of the United States in which the culture of honor is strongest,89 a man’s 
 
84. See Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 33 (1984) (“Reasonable people do not kill no matter how much they 
are provoked . . . .  We cheapen both life and our conception of responsibility by maintaining 
the provocation/passion mitigation.”). 
85. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985) (“[T]he use of force upon or toward 
another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary 
for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person 
on the present occasion.”). 
86. Id. § 3.05(2)(a) (“[W]hen the actor would be obliged [under the section on self-
defense] to retreat . . . he is not obliged to do so before using force for the protection of 
another person, unless he knows that he can thereby secure the complete safety of such other 
person.”). 
87. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
88. For example, killings of women in Middle Eastern countries who have been accused 
of sexual misbehavior is a product of a culture of honor. 
 
The concept of honor (sharaf) has to do with social standing on the basis of moral 
behavior; men’s honor is intimately connected to the sexual chastity of their female 
relatives.  Thus a woman’s or girl’s bad conduct would not only embarrass her 
family but would impugn the honor of the entire family, particularly the men, who 
have the right and duty of defending this honor. 
Catherine Warrick, The Vanishing Victim: Criminal Law and Gender in Jordan, 39 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 315, 322 (2005). 
89. See Keith F. Otterbein, Five Feuds: An Analysis of Homicides in Eastern Kentucky in 
the Late Nineteenth Century, 102 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 231, 232, 234 (2000); Nigel Barber, 
 
07 -HUIGENS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  2:01 PM 
2011–2012] PROVOCATION AT FACE VALUE 433 
 
engaging in adultery with another man’s wife is not a legal justification 
for the husband to kill the adulterer.90  If the husband kills his wife in 
this situation, is this acceptable because she has violated an oath?  
Clearly not.  Is it acceptable because a man’s wife is his property, for 
him to dispose of as he wishes?  Certainly not.  So what are we to make 
of the fact that the central case of provocation produces the most 
offensive justification arguments?  Normatively, it is ample reason to 
avoid any suggestion, in provocation doctrine or procedure, that 
provocation is a justification defense.  Descriptively, it suggests that 
provocation is not a justification argument as a conceptual matter. 
It is all the more striking, then, to see how well a proof procedure for 
justification defenses works to prove provocation manslaughter.  In the 
proof of a justification defense, the burdens of production and 
persuasion are divided between the defense and the prosecution, 
respectively, and the prosecution is required to prove non-justification 
beyond a reasonable doubt.91  If provocation were proved this way, then 
there would be no incentives problem, nor any constitutional problem.  
The defendant would have the incentive to make a prima facie case of 
provocation; and given that the defendant is likely to have the best 
evidence for provocation, and would benefit from proof of provocation, 
it would make practical sense to give the defense this burden.  After the 
 
Is Southern Violence Due to a Culture of Honor?, HUMAN BEAST BLOG (Apr. 2, 2009), 
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-human-beast/200904/is-southern-violence-due-
culture-honor. 
90. According to the Supreme Court of Georgia, 
 
In this day of no-fault, on-demand divorce when adultery is merely a misdemeanor, 
and when there is a debate ranging in the country about whether capital 
punishment even for the most heinous crimes is proper, any idea that a spouse is 
ever justified in taking the life of another—adulterous spouse or illicit lover—to 
prevent adultery is uncivilized.  This is murder; and henceforth, nothing more 
appearing, an instruction on justifiable homicide may not be given.  Such homicides 
will stand on the same footing as any other homicides.  Our ruling should not, 
however, be read to mean that the peculiar facts of a given case may never suggest 
‘passion’ and ‘provocation’ within the meaning of the voluntary manslaughter 
statute. 
Burger v. State, 231 S.E.2d 769, 771 (Ga. 1977) (internal citations omitted). 
91. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 375 (N.J. 1984) (“Rather, if any evidence 
raising the issue of self-defense is adduced, either in the State’s or the defendant’s case, then 
the jury must be instructed that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the self-defense claim does not accord with the facts; acquittal is required if there remains a 
reasonable doubt whether the defendant acted in self-defense.”). 
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defense has raised a claim of provocation, the prosecution would be 
eager to prove non-provocation beyond a reasonable doubt, just as it 
proves non-justification beyond a reasonable doubt.  Success would 
secure a murder conviction. 
In addition to distributing the incentives the right way around, this 
procedure would not violate the Due Process requirement of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Placing the burden to prove non-
justification on the prosecution is not constitutionally required, but it is 
unquestionably permitted.92  The government can make things as 
difficult for itself as it pleases.  If we used a justification proof 
procedure, then placing the burden to prove non-provocation on the 
prosecution would meet constitutional demands even if murder and 
provocation manslaughter were defined in close contradistinction to one 
another. 
Recall that such close contradistinction was the fundamental defect 
of the proof procedure in Mullaney v. Wilbur.93  Because heat of passion 
was the converse of malice, to impose the burden to prove the former on 
the defense was to relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving the 
latter. 94  The real problem in Mullaney, however, and the problem later 
alleged in Patterson v. New York, was that the defendant’s burden of 
persuasion—and, therefore, the prosecution’s as well—was a mere 
preponderance.95  The problem was not that the defendant had an 
evidentiary burden; it was that the quantum of evidence required of the 
defendant had increased from an amount sufficient to raise a reasonable 
doubt to an amount sufficient to constitute a preponderance—an 
increased burden that was imposed because the defendant had raised an 
argument that he had a right to raise.96 
If Maine law had required heat of passion to be proved as a 
justification defense is proved, then there would have been no practical 
 
92. Compare Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 236 (1987) (burden of persuasion for self-
defense may be placed on the defendant), with Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 24–25 
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing, with approval, cases upholding federal rule that places 
burden of persuasion to disprove self-defense on the government). 
93. See 421 U.S. 684, 703–04 (1975). 
94. See id. at 701–04. 
95. See id. at 703; Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208–09 (1977). 
96. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703 (“Under this burden of proof a defendant can be given 
a life sentence when the evidence indicates that it is as likely as not that he deserves a 
significantly lesser sentence.”). 
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or constitutional problem in Mullaney.  The procedure for proving 
justification defenses in most jurisdictions is that, once the defendant 
has presented sufficient evidence for each justification element, the 
prosecution must prove non-justification beyond a reasonable doubt.97  
Applied to provocation, the effect of the defendant’s coming forward 
with even a small quantum of evidence of heat of passion would be to 
raise a reasonable doubt about malice.  A conviction for manslaughter—
a killing done without malice—would follow under the law of lesser 
included offenses.98  If the defendant were able to raise such a 
reasonable doubt about malice, then it would be up to the prosecution 
to disprove heat of passion.  Given that heat of passion raises a 
reasonable doubt about malice, the prosecution would dispel this doubt 
and avoid a mere conviction for manslaughter by reinforcing its case for 
malice in a way that addressed heat of passion specifically.  It would be 
no more or less difficult for the prosecution to foreclose a reasonable 
doubt in this way, on this issue, than it is with respect to any other 
element that it sets out to prove.  This proof procedure would not 
violate the Constitution because it would not raise the defendant’s 
evidentiary burden or shift the prosecution’s burden of persuasion onto 
him.99 
The fact that we might prove provocation in the same way that we 
prove justification defenses does not imply that provocation is a 
justification.  It merely suggests that this is so, and we have ample means 
available to us to counter any such suggestion—the simplest of these 
being to overtly repudiate its repellant moral implications.  However, 
while these measures might serve to counter the normative suggestion, 
they are not necessarily sufficient to counter the descriptive suggestion 
that provocation is a justification as a conceptual matter. 
Given this possibility, we should take a closer look at what the 
application of the proof procedure for justification defenses tells us 
about the formal features of provocation manslaughter.  We obviously 
do not want to read too much into the fact that provocation could be 
proved in the way we prove justification defenses, but for analytical 
purposes it is worth looking into what might be read into it. 
 
97. See supra note 91. 
98. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c)(1); see also Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 & 
n.6 (1973) (applying Rule 31(c)). 
99. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 208–10. 
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First, the fact that we could prove provocation in the way that we 
prove legal justification suggests that provocation has to do with 
criminal wrongdoing, as opposed to the status or characteristics of the 
wrongdoer.  According to one view of justification defenses, the reason 
that the prosecution ordinarily has the burden of proving justification 
defenses beyond a reasonable doubt is that a crime has not been proved 
unless and until non-justification has been proved.  This view is known, 
broadly speaking, as the negative elements view of justification 
defenses, one version of which is the continuity view.100  There are 
difficulties with each of the competing analyses of justification defenses, 
but the continuity view best explains why the prosecution has the 
burden of persuasion to prove non-justification.  The reason is simply 
that offense elements and justification elements are the mirror images of 
one another, so that the prosecution’s proof of non-justification tracks 
its proof of an offense.  This is particularly true with respect to the 
offenses’ corresponding fault and non-fault elements—for example, 
negligence and reasonable belief, respectively.  A reasonable belief that 
one faces an imminent threat implies that a defendant is not negligent 
about the fact that, as it turns out, he did not face an imminent threat.  
An unreasonable belief that he faces an imminent threat implies that the 
defendant is negligent about not being justified in this respect.  If 
proving provocation manslaughter like we prove justification defenses 
works well, then perhaps provocation is like justification, in that it too is 
part of criminal wrongdoing.  Even setting aside the thesis that 
provocation should be taken at face value, this seems very likely 
because, regardless of whether it is a defense or an offense, the 
provocation argument operates exclusively within the confines of 
homicide. 
Second, the suggestion that provocation has to do with criminal 
wrongdoing is bolstered by the fact that offenses, justification defenses, 
and provocation, respectively, have a basic feature in common: their 
amenability to mistake arguments.  Obviously, a mistake of fact 
regarding the offense is a good defense.  There is, of course, a defense of 
mistaken justification.  And, as I noted above, a defense of mistaken 
provocation is recognized.101  From the perspective of mistake, then, 
provocation is not only like a justification defense but also like an 
 
100. See Huigens, supra note 28, at 645–53. 
101. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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offense.  In this light, it seems even more clear that provocation has to 
do with criminal wrongdoing generally.  In the resemblance of 
provocation and offenses with respect to mistake, there is even a 
suggestion that provocation manslaughter might be an offense. 
Beyond this point, however, the analogy begins to break down.  The 
mistake of fact defense in offenses and justification defenses operates to 
negate the fault elements in their respective definitions.  If I go hunting 
and shoot a person whom I believe to be a deer, then I have not shot a 
human being purposely, knowingly, or recklessly.  It never occurred to 
me that this “deer” was a person, and so I could not have had the 
requisite mental state regarding the element of “person” or “human 
being” in the offense definition.102  If my actual belief is also reasonable, 
then I have not shot a person negligently either—and so have not 
committed a homicide of any kind.  On a negative elements or 
continuity view of justification defenses, the mistake analysis is the 
same.  If I kill a person who threatens to shoot me with a gun, but the 
threat is just a practical joke and the gun is made of rubber, then I have, 
nevertheless, committed murder.  I have purposely killed a human being 
in the absence of justifying facts.  However, if it honestly never occurred 
to me that this deadly attack was merely a joke, and if my not seeing 
that this was a joke was reasonable under the circumstances, then I 
killed a person purposely, but I was justified in doing so.103  Again, I did 
not commit any criminal wrongdoing. 
Whether we take provocation manslaughter to be an offense or a 
defense, however, mistaken provocation does not work this way.  First, a 
belief that provoking circumstances are present when they are not 
present does not negate either the fault elements of an offense, such as 
knowledge that one’s victim is a human being; or the fault elements of a 
justification defense, such as knowledge that one does not face an 
imminent threat.  The definition of provocation manslaughter does not 
pair its non-homicide elements—heat of passion, provoking 
circumstances, or extreme mental or emotional disturbance—with 
mental states fault elements such as purpose, knowledge, or 
 
102. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1–.2 (1980). 
103. Whether I am actually justified when I make an honest mistake about justifying 
circumstances, or in some sense merely “excused,” is one of the principal controversies in the 
theory of justification defenses.  I have taken the position that the mistake results in actual 
justification because fault or mens rea regarding non-justification has not been proved.  See 
Huigens, supra note 28, at 630. 
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recklessness.104  I can claim provocation without having to prove that I 
knew I was acting under the heat of passion or under an emotional 
disturbance.  I merely have to have acted in this way.  A good case of 
provocation depends on one’s reaction to a belief in, say, adultery, and 
not on the belief itself. 
Second, the basic logic of mistake in provocation, on one hand, and 
offenses and justification defenses, on the other, is clearly different.  
Where the latter defenses are concerned, we exculpate because of 
ignorance and the concomitant fact that the defendant has acted as he 
otherwise would not have done.105  A mistake resulting in provocation 
exculpates in spite of ignorance, because the defendant has reacted, and 
acted, as he otherwise would have done.106  In formal terms, a mistake 
about provocation does not mitigate, if it does, for the reason that it 
negates fault elements (such as negligence) or that it establishes non-
fault elements (such as reasonableness).  As we will see, this is so 
because provoking circumstances and the reaction to them are 
themselves fault criteria that consist of objective circumstances instead 
of subjective states.  Provocation is not a justification defense simply 
because it does not operate as one. 
C.  Provocation Is a Fault Criterion in a Manslaughter Offense 
Where do these points leave us?  On one hand, provocation is not a 
claim of non-responsibility, in part because it has to do with the 
defendant’s acts of wrongdoing and not with his condition.  This 
suggests that provocation might be a justification because justifications 
have to do with wrongdoing; this suggestion is supported by the fact that 
proving provocation in the same way that we prove justification 
defenses would work well, both in practice and as a constitutional 
matter.  Ultimately, however, the concept of provocation as a 
 
104. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (“Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter when . . . a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse.”). 
105. Cf. Woods v. Warden, 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 529, 529 (Super. Ct. 2004) (“If he had not 
exaggerated the threat against him, presumably he would not have pulled out the pistol and 
by exaggerating the threat, a claim could have been made of mistake of fact and potentially a 
viable defense of self-defense.”). 
106. See State v. Yanz, 50 A. 37, 39 (Conn. 1901) (“Such a belief, though a mistaken one, 
is calculated to induce the same emotions as would be felt were the wrongful act in fact 
committed.”). 
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justification defense is no more viable than the concept of provocation 
as a defense of non-responsibility.  As mistake analysis shows, the basic 
logic and operations of the respective defenses are fundamentally 
different.  What is left? 
What is left is the concept of provocation manslaughter as an 
offense.  This way of looking at provocation fits with the idea that it is a 
matter of wrongdoing, thus avoiding the principal weakness of 
provocation as a claim of non-responsibility.  It recognizes that 
provocation is a matter of wrongdoing—but without running afoul of 
the fundamental moral objections and descriptive differences that rout 
any suggestion that provocation is a defense of justification.  If 
provocation is a matter of criminal fault and, therefore, of criminal 
wrongdoing, and if provocation is not the justification part of 
wrongdoing, then provocation manslaughter is an offense. 
My thesis requires me to show more than this, however.  I need to 
show that provocation works, with respect to murder, in the same way 
that reckless manslaughter does.  Proof of reckless conduct disproves 
murder based on purposeful or knowing conduct, because recklessness 
is conceptually different from purpose or knowledge, such that the 
presence of the former excludes the latter.  A conceptual argument for 
taking provocation at face value will have to show that proof of a 
manslaughter based on provoking circumstances also logically precludes 
a conviction for murder based on purposeful or knowing conduct, and 
that it does this because provoking circumstances and their influence on 
the offender are different from purpose or knowledge in such a way that 
the presence of the former excludes the latter.  I will have to show, 
furthermore, that there is a viable procedure that allows us to prove 
these offenses in a way that is consistent with this theoretical picture. 
III.  PROVOCATION AS CRIMINAL FAULT 
A.  Provoking Circumstances as Offense Elements 
If some guy in a bar was jabbing you in the chest in that soft spot just 
inside your shoulder, over and over again, hard enough to push you 
backwards; and if you’d tried to push him back, but couldn’t; and if he 
was so up in your face and so smug that he couldn’t see you pull a very 
sharp knife out of your pocket and open it behind your back; and if 
anyone who could see you do this either hated him or loved blood 
enough to say nothing, then when he finally backed you up against the 
wall, would you push the knife in as far as it would go, and pull upward 
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as hard as you could? 
If you came home from the store and found a man raping your son, 
and if this man had laid his gun down on a table so that it was now much 
closer to you than to him, would you aim it at his chest or at his head?  If 
in his confusion and shock he let your child slip away, would you 
deliberately hesitate so that he would know he was about to die?  Would 
you smile?  Would you pull the trigger? 
Let us suppose that you have answered “no” to each of these 
questions (which, for what it is worth, seems likely to me because the 
vast majority of people would answer this way).  This answer makes 
these cases of non-homicide, of course, in which provocation doctrine 
does not come into play.  In an analysis of provocation manslaughter, 
however, it is useful to approach the question this way around.  Because 
it is a prediction about your own behavior, your answer shows that you 
have an expectation, not only about what would happen as a matter of 
fact, but also about what ought to happen.  This is so because part of 
your prediction about what would happen, presumably, is that you 
would have lived up to your own standards of behavior. 
This normative expectation is the defining feature of criminal fault.  
We generalize the expectations that we have of ourselves so that we 
expect no less from other human beings.  When a person’s acts violate a 
criminal prohibition, we do not find the case for punishment complete 
unless we also find that they have behaved unreasonably, or that they 
have disregarded a risk that they ought to have avoided, or that they 
have intentionally done an act that is so far outside the range of 
acceptable behavior that we have taken the trouble to ban it by law.  
John Gardner coined the term “normative expectations” for the 
purpose of describing criminal fault.107  He writes about violations of 
these expectations in terms of excusing criminal wrongdoing—but it 
comes to the same thing:108 
 
107. See JOHN GARDNER, The Gist of Excuses, in OFFENCES AND DEFENCES: 
SELECTED ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 121, 124 (2007). 
108. American criminal law and scholarship refers to non-responsible agency as an 
“excuse,” but English courts and theorists call non-responsibility defenses, sensibly, non-
responsibility defenses.  They use the word “excuse” in a sense that corresponds to non-fault 
in American terms.  For example, American law and theory analyzes mistake of fact in terms 
of a failure to prove the fault elements of an offense.  In British law and theory—in which 
offenses often are not defined in terms of discrete elements—mistake of fact is analyzed using 
the term “excuse.”  See, e.g., A.P. SIMESTER & G.R. SULLIVAN, CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY 
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The gist of an excuse, as I will try to explain, is precisely that the 
person with the excuse lived up to our expectations. . . .  One 
may have an image of someone excusing themselves by saying: 
“I’ve always been spiteful and malicious, so how did you expect 
me to behave?”  Being spiteful and malicious is, of course, no 
excuse for anything.  Pointing to the spite and malice in one’s 
wrongful actions is asserting, not denying, that these actions cast 
one in a bad light.  So the question, for excusatory purposes, is 
obviously not whether the person claiming the excuse lived up to 
expectations in the predictive sense of being true to form or true 
to type or even true to our disappointing experience of human 
beings in general.  The question is whether that person lived up 
to expectations in the normative sense.109 
 
In fact, Gardner describes provocation manslaughter in these terms 
(setting aside, apparently, the traditional rule that a manslaughter 
instruction cannot be given where there was only verbal provocation): 
“In the face of constant taunts, did this person exhibit as much self-
restraint as we have a right to demand of someone in her situation?”110  
If the person did demonstrate the expected amount of self-restraint in 
this situation, then the jury would be instructed on provocation 
manslaughter. 
To illustrate Gardner’s point, suppose that, in the first of my 
hypothetical cases, you did kill the other person.  You were, after all, in 
a bar in which the regulars apparently regard bar fights as blood sport.  
It appears that you are a regular here, because you carry a knife large 
enough to kill another person, are capable of stabbing another person in 
the belly, know how kill this way, and are enraged to the point of 
irrationality because, like a lot of alcoholics, you are prone to rage.  As a 
result, you kill this guy who is physically taunting you in front of a crowd 
of people who are likely to read a failure to retaliate as a sign of 
weakness.  You might have met our descriptive expectations by killing 
 
AND DOCTRINE 547 (2d ed. 2003) (“Any mistake that D makes when committing an offense 
will have no bearing on her criminal liability unless it causes her to lack mens rea or provides 
her with a legally recognised excuse.”); J.C. SMITH & BRIAN HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 188 
(5th ed. 1983) (“Where the law requires intention or recklessness with respect to some 
element in the actus reus, a mistake, whether reasonable or not, . . . will excuse.”). 
109. GARDNER, supra note 107, at 124. 
110. Id. 
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the other man, but you have failed to meet normative expectations—as 
a result of which, you probably will be convicted of murder, not 
manslaughter. 
In the second case, of course, you are nothing like this.  You are an 
ordinary middle-class person—a mother who, until this moment, could 
not imagine herself using a gun at all, let alone taking a life with it.  At 
the moment of decision, with a gun in your hand, you could have killed 
this animal—or so you thought.  Confronted with this horrific scene, you 
surprised even yourself when you decided that aiming at his chest was 
the better shot, and then did not take it.  Most of your friends and family 
will say that they were surprised that you did not kill the rapist.  
Apparently, unlike the knife-wielding guy in the bar, you failed to meet 
expectations as a descriptive matter.  However—again unlike the guy in 
the bar—you did meet normative expectations.  Even your surprised 
friends would say that you were right, in the end, just to hold the man at 
gunpoint and dial 911 with your free hand. 
The value of looking at provocation manslaughter in terms of 
criminal fault, and at criminal fault in terms of normative expectations, 
is that it shifts attention away from the emotional upset involved in 
these cases, and draws attention, instead, to the provoking 
circumstances themselves.  More to the point, it allows us to conduct a 
certain kind of conversation about provocation cases.  Suppose, for 
example, that the mother who is confronted with the sight of her son’s 
being raped had discovered that his baseball coach had a record of 
sexual misconduct, and that the coach had invited himself over to her 
house for some individual batting practice with her son.  She delayed 
going home after work on the off chance that she might catch the man 
engaging in some sort of inappropriate behavior with her son and then 
discovered him engaged in an act that was far worse than anything she 
had imagined.  If she killed the man, she might get an instruction on 
provocation manslaughter because the situation meets the letter of the 
defense, and because there is some evidence that supports a rational 
verdict of manslaughter.  But she is very, very unlikely to succeed with 
the jury in making this argument.  Her conduct leading up to the 
shooting, and her conduct as a mother specifically, reflect poorly on her, 
to say the least. 
Would her conviction be attributable to anything more than the 
jury’s disapproval of her actions leading up to the killing?  Well, no, it 
would not be, and my point is that this is as it should be.  The Model 
Penal Code formulates provocation in terms of “extreme mental or 
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emotional disturbance,” but notice that its “reasonable explanation or 
excuse” language facilitates a normative evaluation of this emotional 
upset and, more importantly, of the actions leading up to the killing.111  
The reasonableness of an emotional upset—which emphatically is not 
the same as the reasonable man standard—is the pivot point of our 
evaluation of her provocation claim. 
This evaluation consists of a conversation about our normative 
expectations and whether the defendant has met them.  We expect 
citizens not to engage in vigilantism, and we certainly expect a parent 
not to take chances with her son’s well-being in the service of such a 
misbegotten mission.  If, at the end of this disaster, the mother winds up 
being distraught to the point of committing murder, then she has no 
reasonable explanation or excuse for being in that condition.  We 
expect, descriptively, that no murder would have occurred, not least 
because we believe, normatively, that she should not have created this 
problem at all. 
To see the significance of this conversation more clearly, consider 
the contrast with the prevailing consensus on the nature of provocation 
manslaughter.  If provocation were a matter of partial incapacity due to 
overwhelming mental or emotional disturbance, then we would be 
unable to conduct a meaningful conversation about either our 
descriptive expectations concerning homicide versus non-homicide or 
our normative expectations in this regard.  Our descriptive expectations 
would be so fact dependent and context sensitive (how upset was the 
defendant, exactly?) that it would be difficult to say that we had any 
expectations about mental or emotional disturbance at all—except for 
normative expectations.  But if provocation were a matter of emotional 
upset, and if our normative expectations turned on this question—as 
they would under the prevailing understanding—then we could not be 
said to have any meaningful normative expectations either.  There 
would be no gap between our descriptive and normative expectations.  
If the defendant was very upset, then we would expect him to commit 
homicide and also, accordingly, to receive a manslaughter verdict.  If he 
was not very upset, then we would not expect him to commit homicide, 
and we would also not expect him to need a manslaughter instruction.  
This uninteresting picture is a defect in the partial non-responsibility 
view of provocation.  The fact is that we can and do conduct meaningful 
 
111. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1980). 
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conversations about normative expectations in provocation cases. 
Consider the case of the stabbing in the bar.  As I have described it 
so far, we would expect the provocation instruction to be given, but we 
would not expect the jury to convict the defendant only of 
manslaughter.  This case looks and sounds more like a murder, 
regardless of how badly upset the defendant might have been when he 
was taunted in the bar. 
Suppose, however, that he had not been to the bar in a year or so, 
because he had been going to Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, trying 
to get sober.  As part of his twelve-step program, he wants to make 
amends to one of his old drinking buddies for, say, stealing some snow 
tires out of his garage.  Things do not go as the defendant had hoped, 
and he eventually finds himself cornered in the way that I described it 
above.  In this variation, the defendant has a much better chance of 
succeeding with a plea of provocation manslaughter. 
Notice that the emotional upset the defendant feels is the same as it 
was before.  He is frightened, intimidated, and embarrassed.  It is also 
largely the same case of mutual combat—a slow-building shoving match 
that gets out of hand, even though one of the participants is trying to 
hold his temper.  The only difference is the different back story, but this 
new back story gives us a different result.  Mutual combat looks 
different when it grows out of getting sober and trying to make amends, 
as opposed to the idiotic macho posturing that usually precedes bar 
fights.  The jury will view the defendant more favorably because he is 
actively trying to recover from drinking.  This increased sympathy will 
contribute to a verdict of manslaughter.  Is there anything wrong with 
this?  Does the result turn on impermissible factors?  No.  The 
defendant’s recovery from alcoholism is exactly the kind of thing that 
provocation doctrine is meant to make relevant. 
Because we have meaningful conversations about descriptive and 
normative expectations, we have a different way of thinking about 
provocation available to us.  This different way of thinking about 
provocation manslaughter consists of thinking in terms of normative 
expectations, and this means thinking about provocation in terms of 
fault in criminal wrongdoing.  I will argue below that, when we evaluate 
criminal fault, we conduct a wide-ranging evaluation of the set of 
objective circumstances and subjective states that obtained when the 
defendant acted.  When we define criminal offenses, these objective 
circumstances and subjective states are the material that we use to 
formulate fault elements.  The ways in which we do this, and the 
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significance of the various choices that we make when we do it, are the 
subjects of Parts III.B, III.C, and III.D, below.  We will see that an 
“extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse,”112 is not an intent element, but it does 
describe an intentional action.  It also describes intentions and does this 
job in a way that permits a more complete assessment of desert for legal 
punishment than a subjective-states intent element would do.  From this 
perspective, again, it is the reasonable explanation or excuse, and not 
the extreme mental or emotional disturbance, that is the primary 
component of the fault criterion that defines provocation manslaughter. 
B.  The Presumed Primacy of Subjective Fault Criteria 
The law of homicide includes some homicides defined in terms of 
subjective-states fault criteria (such as premeditated murder113 and 
reckless manslaughter114) and some homicides defined in terms of 
objective-circumstances fault criteria (such as negligent homicide;115 
malice murder;116 and, I contend, provocation manslaughter). 
In the first kind of fault criterion, subjective states of mind—to 
“purposely” or knowingly” cause death, for example117—do the 
normative work of determining the gravity of the offense.  In the second 
kind of fault criterion, the circumstances of the offense do the normative 
work of grading.  Circumstances reasonably giving rise to “extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance” reduce murder to manslaughter;118 and 
“circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 
life” raise manslaughter to murder.119  Nevertheless, subjective-states 
fault criteria are taken to be primary here, too.  Subjective-states fault 
criteria function as normative anchors, so to speak.  Only a purposeful 
or knowing homicide is mitigated by provocation, and only a reckless 
 
112. Id. 
113. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(1)(a) (West 2009) (“A person is 
guilty of murder in the first degree when . . . [w]ith a premeditated intent to cause the death 
of another person, he or she causes the death of such person or of a third person . . . .”). 
114. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(a). 
115. See, e.g., id. § 210.4. 
116. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (2006) (“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human 
being with malice aforethought.”). 
117. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(a). 
118. See, e.g., id. § 210.3(1)(b). 
119. See, e.g., id. § 210.2(1)(b). 
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homicide can be elevated to murder based on the circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference.  Standing alone, these objective 
circumstances are thought to be too amorphous to justify the substantial 
legal punishment that we impose in cases of homicide.  Many courts and 
scholars have taken the position that negligence is insufficient to support 
criminal liability for any but minor offenses.120  Even fewer would 
condone the stand-alone use of these other, even less well-defined, 
objective fault criteria in the definition and adjudication of homicide 
offenses. 
Given this state of the law, it is natural to think that subjective-states 
criminal fault criteria have conceptual and normative primacy over 
objective-circumstances fault criteria.  It appears that the second kind of 
criterion can only ever be a variation, proxy, approximation, or special 
case of the first kind.  This appearance is fundamentally misleading, 
however.  A perpetual campaign to eliminate objective fault criteria 
from criminal law has conspicuously failed to do so because doing so is 
impossible.  Objective-fault criteria pop up again and again, like weeds 
in an obsessively tended lawn, because these weeds are the native 
plants.121  The objective features of offenses, not subjective states, are 
the paradigmatic fault criteria, because criminal fault consists of 
particularly salient aspects of criminal wrongdoing. 
To say that criminal fault consists of particularly salient aspects of 
offenses is not to say that fault criteria are only implicit in offense 
definitions, where they operate invisibly and mysteriously.122  On the 
contrary, these salient features of offenses have been generalized and 
 
120. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 4 (1985) (“No one has doubted that purpose, 
knowledge, and recklessness are properly the basis for criminal liability, but some critics have 
opposed any penal consequences for negligent behavior.”); see also Jerome Hall, Negligent 
Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 632, 634–35 (1963). 
121. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(d) (2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(2) 
(West 2007) (defining traditional depraved heart murder); Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 
56 (1996) (upholding Montana statute excluding proof of voluntary intoxication to disprove 
purpose or knowledge in murder cases); People v. Scott, 927 P.2d 288, 294 (Cal. 1996) 
(upholding convictions for both attempted murder and murder on a transferred intent 
rationale); People v. Luparello, 231 Cal. Rptr. 832, 853 (Ct. App. 1986) (upholding 
accomplice’s conviction for murder on ground that murder was foreseeable); State v. Oliver, 
627 A.2d 144, 152 (N.J. 1993) (requiring reasonable mistake as to consent for acquittal). 
122. This is true, however, of so-called strict liability offenses.  I have previously tried to 
dispel the mystery.  See Kyron Huigens, Is Strict Liability Rape Defensible?, in DEFINING 
CRIMES: ESSAYS ON THE SPECIAL PART OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 196, 196–97 (R.A. Duff & 
Stuart P. Green eds., 2005). 
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formalized, and appear in regular forms from offense to offense.  Willful 
ignorance and conditional intent, to take two examples, substitute for 
knowledge and purpose, respectively.123  The point of looking at willful 
ignorance and conditional intent as salient features of the offense is to 
recognize that knowledge and purpose are no more than this 
themselves. 
All four formal fault criteria stand on equal ground, and the 
objective-circumstances kind of fault criteria are not derivative, inferior 
substitutes for the intentional-states kind, as a conceptual or a 
normative matter.  The act of avoiding knowledge of some criminal 
circumstance is about as blameworthy as the state of knowing the 
circumstance, but the relationship that each condition has to that 
circumstance is fundamentally different.  When it relates to an element 
of an offense, willful ignorance marks the gravity of a wrong at 
approximately the same level that knowledge marks it.  It does not 
perform this grading function as a proxy for knowledge.  It performs the 
same function in its own right.  The absence of knowledge is not a kind 
of knowledge; it is a different state altogether. 
The same is true of conditional intent relative to subjective intent.  A 
conditional intent could be described as an intent to have an intent.  
Described this way, conditional intent sounds like blameworthiness once 
removed, like a feeble echo of real criminal fault.  But this is precisely 
what tells us that conditional intent is not derivative of a subjective 
intent.  “Get out of the car or I’ll kill you,” does not sound like a feeble 
echo of anything.  It is a threat, an objective circumstance that plays the 
same role as an unconditional intent, but that has its own distinct 
normative significance—that of marking a certain level of gravity in 
wrongdoing, one that more or less matches that marked by subjective 
intent. 
Were our criminal code more fine-grained than it is in its use of fault 
criteria, willful ignorance and conditional intent might each serve to 
define different grades of some offenses than the grades defined by 
 
123. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (“When knowledge of the existence of a 
particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware 
of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist.”); 
Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 4, 12 (1999) (holding that the evidence that defendant 
planned “to steal the cars without harming the victims, but that he would have used his gun if 
any of the drivers had given him a ‘hard time,’” is sufficient to establish “the intent ‘to cause 
death or serious bodily harm’”). 
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knowledge and intent.124  Even as matters stand, however, the use of one 
kind of fault criterion to substitute for the other in an offense definition 
in no way implies that the objective-circumstances fault criteria are 
subordinate to subjective-states fault criteria.  Each kind of fault 
criterion relates to desert for legal punishment in precisely the same 
way.  The failure to recognize this, and the mistaken perception that 
subjective states of mind are a primary kind of criminal fault, may be 
traced to two sources: a failure to distinguish between intentions and 
intentional actions, and a failure to distinguish between intent as an 
offense element and intentions as natural kinds. 
C.  Intentions and Intentional Acts 
To begin with the first error, it seems that an intentional act is the 
product of an intention so to act, on a one-to-one basis.  If I 
intentionally run my car off the road, then this is because I had an 
intention to run my car off the road.  We tend to take a statement such 
as this one to be a complete account of intentional actions.  It is not a 
complete account, however, and the idea that it is one rests on a 
misconception of intentionality.  It fails to include all of my relevant 
intentions in the description of my intentional act.125  If I intentionally 
run my car off the road, then this is equally because I have an intention 
to die, an intention to show my girlfriend that she does not appreciate 
me, and an intention to ride my beloved Camaro out in a blaze of glory. 
An intentional act arises from a number of different motivating 
intentions in addition to the simple intention so to act.  Therefore, the 
intentional act featured in an offense definition cannot be equated, in a 
simple, straightforward way with an intention to so act.  The intention to 
cause death, for example, is not the only source of an intentional act of 
killing, because it is not the only intention that motivates the killing.  To 
ignore all but the simplest intention in an analysis of our intentional 
actions is a fatal omission in the analysis of criminal fault.  It is our 
intentions, not our intentional actions, that define our desert for legal 
punishment, and our relevant intentions are more numerous and 
 
124. In fact, before the drafting and widespread adoption of the Model Penal Code, state 
criminal codes did contain more objective and fine-grained fault criteria than they do now.  
See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL 
LAW DOESN’T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 48 (2006). 
125. See MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON 111–13 
(1987). 
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complex than the simple intention to kill.  As a result, our basis for 
inferring criminal fault from a person’s actions is far broader than the 
intentional action described in an offense definition. 
To see why this is so, consider the relationship between intentions 
and desert for punishment.  I have used John Gardner’s idea of 
normative expectations to explain criminal fault, and described specific 
expectations in specific hypothetical contexts.126  But how should we 
describe the relevant expectations generally?  What is their significance 
for desert? 
Gardner says that the relevant expectations are those that concern 
our role as human beings in society, and notes that this is an Aristotelian 
idea.127  A more fully developed Aristotelian account specifies the 
relevant role as that of a deliberator on ends.128  The agent’s 
deliberations on ends matter because this is where responsibility lies.129  
For Aristotle, human beings are inherently social beings,130 and they 
have a distinctive ergon, a teleological purpose, of rational action.131  A 
failure to reason well in practical matters—and in particular to reason 
well with regard to the society of which one is partly constituted and 
partly constitutive132—is the salient failure of the wrongful actor in 
Aristotelian ethics.133 
Criminal law focuses on intentions in defining and adjudicating 
desert for punishment because our intentions reflect the quality of our 
practical reasoning, and so indicate whether punishment is deserved.  
Our reasons for acting come from our beliefs and desires, but the 
coordination of our reasons and actions, whether for ourselves or in 
cooperation with others, is the job of intentions.  One defining mark of 
intentions, as a result, is that they are embedded in plans,134 and plans 
reflect the long-term deliberations that have led the offender into 
criminal wrongdoing.  We naturally inquire into the intentions that 
 
126. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
127. See GARDNER, supra note 107, at 129 (identifying the normative expectations 
theory as “broadly Aristotelian”). 
128. Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1449–56 (1995). 
129. Id. at 1451–54. 
130. Id. at 1451–52. 
131. Id. at 1449–50. 
132. Id. at 1454–56. 
133. Id. 
134. See BRATMAN, supra note 125, at 28–29. 
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constitute these plans when we inquire into the quality of the offender’s 
practical reasoning—when we inquire, that is, into his criminal fault. 
Let me give an example of this set of relationships as it appears in a 
case of provocation.  Suppose that an elderly husband kills his 
terminally ill wife of fifty years, and that he does this in order to relieve 
her grave suffering.  Ordinarily, we will say that he intends to kill her, 
and he will be guilty of murder in any jurisdiction because the definition 
of murder refers to an intentional act of killing; that is, it consists in part 
of an element such as “intends” or “intentionally” combined with an 
element such as “kill” or “cause death.” 
However, the statement that the husband intends to kill his wife is 
inaccurate, because it is incomplete.  The husband has acted 
intentionally to kill his wife, and he certainly does have an intention to 
kill.  The important thing to see, however, is that his intention to kill is 
not the only intention that lies behind his intentional act of killing, or 
that is, correspondingly, relevant to his deserving legal punishment.  He 
has other intentions that motivate his intentional act, and these 
intentions are no less relevant to his desert.  These include his intentions 
to relieve suffering, to act lovingly, to honor another person’s rational 
wish to die, and so on.  These other intentions have motivating potential 
for the intentional act of killing, just as his simple intention to kill does, 
and, because of this, they are no less relevant to his deserving legal 
punishment.  For one thing, society has normative expectations with 
regard to each of them.  If the elderly husband’s intentional act of killing 
is the product of such a cluster of intentions, then we will be uneasy (or 
should be) about letting his criminal liability turn on proof of only the 
intentional act of killing. 
This uneasiness creates normative pressure in the direction of more 
complex criteria of criminal fault that will give these other intentions 
legal salience and that will help the law to produce morally defensible 
outcomes.  Criminal fault is inferred from all of the relevant intentions, 
taken together, that lie behind the intentional act described in a legal 
prohibition.  In order to include more of these intentions in the 
determination of desert for legal punishment, we often employ fault 
criteria other than, or in addition to, a description of a subjective state 
such as “intent,” or “purpose,” or “knowledge.”  Objective 
circumstances describe intentional acts more completely than a 
description of a subjective state can do, and this more complete 
description brings a greater number of relevant intentions to bear on the 
question of desert for legal punishment.  This is why, faced with the case 
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of the elderly husband and a criminal code that did not have a broadly 
framed offense of provocation manslaughter, we would amend our 
criminal code to add one. 
D.  Intent Elements and Intentions 
There are two points in this argument that might raise objections.  
First, I suggested that we include objective circumstances, including 
provoking circumstances, among the elements of an offense definition as 
a way of bringing out the full range of the criminal actor’s intentions as 
they bear on his desert for punishment.  One might object that only an 
element of intentional action, such as killing intentionally, can bring out 
these intentions, because objective circumstances fault elements do not 
refer to intentions at all.  Second, I referred to motivating intentions as 
implying criminal fault.  Some readers might object that motivations are 
not mens rea, as black-letter criminal law doctrine has it. 
Both of these objections make the same mistake, which is the second 
one that I referred to at the end of section III.B.  The mistake is to 
equate intent elements in offense definitions with intentions as natural 
kinds.  In other words, the mistake turns on a category error regarding 
criminal intent versus intentionality in general.  In the theory of action, 
intentionality consists of one’s having an object of some kind of 
attention.  If I say, “I love my girlfriend,” then I am describing my 
girlfriend intentionally—as the object of my love.  If I say that I intend 
to marry her, then I am describing the act or state of marriage 
intentionally—as the aim of my actions.  If I say that I will strive always 
to respect my wife’s opinions no matter how radically we disagree on 
something, then I am describing my respect for her intentionally—as 
something that I propose to maintain through difficult times. 
In contrast, to say, in the process of charging me with the murder of 
my wife’s lover, that I acted with an intent to kill a human being, is to 
say that my act of killing meets a formal criterion of criminal fault.  I 
deserve legal punishment if I am at fault in criminal wrongdoing; my 
intention to kill implies my criminal fault, along with my other relevant 
intentions; my intentional act of killing is sufficient evidence of my 
having these inculpating intentions; and an offense element such as 
“intent to kill” serves, in the adjudication of my crime, to guide the 
jury’s decision on whether or not I deserve legal punishment because of 
my intentions. 
The distinction between the formal criterion “intent to kill” and my 
natural intention to do an intentional act of killing, is discernible in the 
07 -HUIGENS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  2:01 PM 
452 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:409 
 
Model Penal Code’s homicide definitions.  The Code drafters wisely 
eschewed the words “intent,” “intended,” and “intentionally” in the 
definition of criminal fault.  They opted, instead, for the terms 
“purpose” and “knowledge” as offense elements.135  These formal fault 
criteria refer to the natural intentions of the accused—and, when used in 
correspondence with the material elements “to cause death” and 
“human being,” to his intentional actions—but they do so without 
raising the danger of confusion between formal element and natural 
kind.  When it is used as a formal entity, “intent” can be replaced with 
new names—such as  purpose or knowledge—with the stroke of a pen.  
In contrast, the actor’s natural intentions are not likely to be renamed in 
the philosophy of action.  They are not terms of art in a formal 
normative system.  They are colloquially entrenched terms for natural 
kinds, and to purport to change them would inevitably be confusing 
rather than clarifying. 
Once we see the difference between intentions and intentional 
actions—and once we see intentional actions as natural kinds, in 
contrast to intent as a formal fault element in offenses—then we should 
be able to see the rationale and value of objective criteria of criminal 
fault.  My desert for legal punishment is constituted, not only by my 
intention to kill, but also by all of my intentions that motivate the 
killing, and these intentions are evidenced by my intentional act of 
killing.  Legal fact-finding concerning my intentional act of killing can be 
guided by an offense element consisting of some phrase such as “intent 
to kill.” 
This is, indeed, the most common fault criterion for murder.  A 
single subjective-state description such as “intent to kill” is extremely 
misleading, however, because it suggests that the only relevant intention 
is the simple intention to kill.  If an offense element is to bring all of my 
relevant intentions into consideration for the purpose of deciding my 
desert for legal punishment, then we are better off if this fault element 
describes more of the situation than a single subjective state of the actor.  
In fact, a fault element need not contain the words “intent” or 
“intentionally,” or similar words such as “purpose” or “knowingly,” at 
all.  Because an intention is merely some kind of attention paid to some 
object, an intentional action and, by way of that, my intentions can be 
adequately described in completely objective terms.  In fact, an offense 
 
135. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(a) (1980). 
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element that describes the circumstances under which criminal 
wrongdoing is done is not only sufficient to describe my inculpating 
intentions and my desert for legal punishment, it is preferable for this 
purpose.  A definition of manslaughter that avers to provoking 
circumstances is actually superior to one that avers to the subjective 
state of recklessness, because it is more comprehensive and more 
specific than a bare reference to the simple intention behind the 
intentional act. 
E.  Provoking Circumstances as Criminal Fault 
How can we best understand provoking circumstances as fault 
elements in an offense definition?  Consider two putative puzzles about 
provocation manslaughter.  First, the common law imposed a “cooling 
off” period.136  If the defendant had time to reflect and calm himself, 
then he could not claim that he was provoked.137  On the consensus view 
of provocation as a non-responsibility defense resting on an emotional 
upset, this seems wrong.  A person obviously can “heat up,” or become 
more emotionally overwrought with the passage of time, if he dwells on 
the provoking circumstances.  Second, the common law also banned 
verbal offense from the set of valid provoking circumstances.138  This 
also seems wrong because insults and verbal abuse can be just as 
upsetting as any other provoking act or event. 
Neither one of these “puzzles” is difficult to figure out once we 
recognize that provocation manslaughter is not a non-responsibility 
defense resting on an emotional upset.  Provoking circumstances are 
fault elements in an offense of manslaughter.  Criminal fault is a matter 
of normative expectations, as Gardner describes it,139 but it is in a deeper 
sense a matter of self-governance.140  A person who dwells on something 
that he finds emotionally upsetting, with the result that he becomes 
increasingly angry, has failed to meet our expectations about self-
governance.  The common phrases “let it go” and “get over it” are 
usually offered as advice, but their imperative phrasing puts a sharp 
 
136. See United States v. Bordeaux, 980 F.2d 534, 537–38 (8th Cir. 1992); Girouard v. 
State, 583 A.2d 718, 721 (Md. 1991). 
137. See Bordeaux, 980 F.2d at 537–38. 
138. See Girouard, 583 A.2d at 721–22. 
139. See GARDNER, supra note 107, at 124. 
140. See Huigens, supra note 128, at 1449–56. 
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normative point on it.  Similarly, we all learn a verse about “sticks and 
stones” when we are very young, and the object of this aphorism is self-
control.  One cannot be expected to simply shrug off physical contact or 
adultery, but we do expect one another to shrug off insults and verbal 
abuse. 
Self-control is the product of practical reasoning over the long term; 
a character trait that embodies society’s normative expectations.  In 
other words, it is a virtue that criminal law requires each of us to acquire 
and maintain.  One learns about sticks and stones, and then practices its 
lesson, at first consciously and then more or less unconsciously.  
Occasionally, it is necessary to remind oneself that words can never 
really hurt, but for the most part, each of us has internalized this lesson 
to such an extent that, not only do we not think about it much, our 
mastery of it makes each of us who we are in an important respect.  
Partly as a result of this particular process, I will become known as thin-
skinned or cool-headed, to pick just two relevant traits.  Self-control is 
only one aspect of self-governance generally, and the latter is the 
product of the universal project of self-definition within society’s 
normative boundaries. 
Criminal law is obviously one important way in which these 
boundaries are set and enforced.  The feature of criminal law that is 
specifically devoted to assessing the quality of the defendant’s practical 
reasoning over the long term is criminal fault.  A failure of self-control 
on a particular occasion manifests a chronic failure of the practical 
reasoning that ought to have produced better self-governance and a 
more tractable character.  When these failures of practical reasoning 
lead a person to engage in conduct that violates a criminal prohibition, 
then the proof of this failure is proof that the violation is more than a 
nominal one.  The failure of practical reasoning is what makes it a case 
of criminal wrongdoing, instead of merely some behavior that violates a 
prohibition. 
The offense elements that serve as fault criteria in offense definitions 
facilitate the jury’s evaluation of this failure, including, of course, 
whether there was such a failure to begin with.  Provoking circumstances 
are among the elements that serve these purposes.  They appear in the 
definition of provocation manslaughter in various guises: heat of 
passion, extreme mental or emotional disturbance, or a common law set 
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of circumstances that includes sudden discovery of adultery and mutual 
combat, among others.141  Regardless of the guise in which they appear, 
however, the offense elements that describe provoking circumstances 
are objective-circumstances fault criteria that describe a failure to 
develop and maintain self-control specifically, and that enable a jury to 
determine whether the offense was committed with criminal fault, as 
constituted by this failure. 
If we look at normative expectations concerning self-control through 
the prism of excuses (in the British sense), as John Gardner does, then 
the question of criminal fault appears to be one of success in meeting 
normative expectations.142  “In the face of constant taunts, did this 
person exhibit as much self-restraint as we have a right to demand of 
someone in her situation?”143  If the defendant did exercise this much 
self-restraint, then she is innocent of murder, at least, in spite of the fact 
that her conduct nominally violates the prohibition on murder.  Her 
conduct, causing the death of a person, is a homicide; and the fact that 
the homicide was committed intentionally would ordinarily make it a 
murder.  But she has met the normative expectations that we have about 
constant taunting, which are that it can, regrettably, lead to intentional 
homicide (assuming, as Gardner apparently does, that we will count 
verbal provocation as sufficient).  We count her killing as a kind of 
success, because she has met the particular expectations that we have, in 
this context, about self-governance and long-term practical reasoning 
concerning the actions that define her as a person.  Because the 
commission of an intentional homicide under provoking circumstances 
meets our normative expectations in these respects, we will not convict 
her of murder.  Her success in meeting normative expectations entitles 
her to a partial defense, because her criminal fault is not as great as the 
fault indicated by an intentional killing standing alone. 
 
141. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 684–85 (1975) (“The State of Maine requires 
a defendant charged with murder to prove that he acted ‘in the heat of passion on sudden 
provocation’ in order to reduce the homicide to manslaughter.” (emphasis added)); Girouard, 
583 A.2d at 720 (noting types of provocation traditionally sufficient to reduce murder to 
manslaughter, including “mutual combat . . . or the sudden discovery of a spouse’s adultery” 
(emphasis added)); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1980) (“Criminal homicide 
constitutes manslaughter when . . . a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable 
explanation or excuse.” (emphasis added)). 
142. See supra notes 107, 109–110 and accompanying text. 
143. GARDNER, supra note 107, at 124. 
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How does provocation as a matter of normative expectations look if 
we approach it from the other direction—that is, as an analysis of fault 
in offenses instead of as a partial defense?  If success in meeting 
normative expectations exculpates, then inculpation consists of a failure 
to meet normative expectations.  This is nearly tautologous, but the 
benefit of analyzing inculpation as a failure to meet normative 
expectations is that it brings out the particularism of criminal fault as it 
plays out in objective-circumstances fault criteria.  We have specific 
normative expectations about specific actions in specific practical 
contexts.  The fault element of provoking circumstances, in its various 
guises, serves to define and enforce these expectations.  Malice and heat 
of passion are, standing alone, imprecise terms, but they served well in 
the common law of crime because of the particularism of common law 
development.  The common law produced a discrete but comprehensive 
set of recognized provoking circumstances—not all of which, 
incidentally, necessarily entailed great passion.144  The Model Penal 
Code’s extreme mental or emotional disturbance formulation is similarly 
particularistic about normative expectations, which is evident once one 
recognizes that the critical inquiry under the Code is not the 
disturbance, but instead the explanation for it.  The jury is instructed to 
look for a reasonable explanation for the mental or emotional 
disturbance, and a reasonableness inquiry is always a particularistic 
inquiry.145 
It is important to note this particularism because the criminal fault 
indicated by a fault element of intent to kill is not only more grave, but 
simply different from the criminal fault indicated by objective-
circumstances fault elements such as heat of passion or extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance.  Viewed as a failure of practical reasoning, a 
provoked killing is a failure of comparable gravity to a killing done 
recklessly.  It is the contrasting terms of these fault criteria, however, 
and not the comparative gravity that each represents, that should draw 
our attention.  Because fault and fault criteria are particularistic, each of 
 
144. Girouard, 583 A.2d at 720–21.  Typically recognized provoking circumstances 
include “extreme assault or battery upon the defendant; mutual combat; defendant’s illegal 
arrest; injury or serious abuse of a close relative of the defendant’s; or the sudden discovery of 
a spouse’s adultery.”  Id. at 720. 
145. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (“[A] homicide which would otherwise be 
murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for 
which there is reasonable explanation or excuse.” (emphasis added)). 
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these four kinds of fault in homicide—intent, recklessness, malice, and 
provocation—is different from the others.  For the same reason, the four 
kinds of fault in homicide are also mutually exclusive.  This is not 
obvious in the case of intentional murder and provocation 
manslaughter, because an intent element appears in the formal 
definition of both offenses.  But the intent to kill simpliciter and the 
intent to kill in the context of provoking circumstances, respectively, are 
entirely different criteria of criminal fault that describe different 
intentional acts that reference different sets of intentions that bear on 
desert of legal punishment. 
Allow me to state this last point again, more completely, because it is 
the heart of my argument.  It is best framed in terms of intentions, 
intentional actions, and intent as an offense element.  The definition of 
murder contains an intent element, and the definition of provocation 
manslaughter contains an intent element.  However, provocation 
manslaughter combines this intent element with a provoking 
circumstances element such as extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance.  As a result of this combination, the intentional act 
described in the definition of murder is different from the intentional act 
described in the definition of provocation manslaughter.  Furthermore, 
those two different intentional acts reflect two different sets of 
intentions held by the murderer and the provoked killer, respectively.  
These two different sets of intentions have different implications for the 
defendant’s desert for legal punishment.  Because of the differences in 
intentional acts and intentions, the criminal fault entailed in provocation 
manslaughter is different from, and exclusive of, the criminal fault 
entailed in a murder.  The fact that intent to kill under provoking 
circumstances and intent to kill standing alone are mutually exclusive 
fault criteria, means that the proof of the former disproves the latter.  A 
defendant who is convicted of provocation manslaughter cannot also be 
convicted of murder.  Provocation manslaughter operates, in this 
respect, just like reckless manslaughter does. 
The fact that intentional murder is disproved by proof of 
provocation manslaughter goes a long way toward justifying the search 
for a cure for the prosecution’s perverse incentive to fail to prove 
provocation manslaughter, were we to treat it as an offense.  It is hardly 
obvious, however, what that cure is. 
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IV.  HOW TO TAKE PROVOCATION AT FACE VALUE 
A.  A Series of Insoluble Difficulties 
It seems that we can spin out the procedure implicit in treating 
provocation as an offense from any starting point without finding any 
point at which we could stop, change something, and then proceed, 
taking provocation at face value thereafter.  It makes little sense in the 
first place to obligate the prosecution to make a prima facie case of a 
provocation offense.  As things stand under current theory and doctrine, 
in order to obtain a conviction for manslaughter in what would 
otherwise be a case of murder, a defendant need only prove the non-
homicide elements in provocation’s definition.  Like many other 
defenses, provocation forestalls a conviction for murder by doing 
something other than negating the intent to kill.  If the defendant fails to 
prove sufficient provoking circumstances, then he is convicted of 
murder.  If he does establish these facts, then he is not convicted of 
murder. 
In contrast, if the prosecution must prove provocation manslaughter, 
then it must prove a murder, including an intent to kill, as an element of 
the offense.  Coming from this direction, the murder forestalls the 
manslaughter, not the other way around, rendering an offense of 
provocation manslaughter incoherent.  This is so because the other 
elements of this manslaughter—the heat of passion, provoking 
circumstances, or understandable mental or emotional disturbance—do 
not negate an intent to kill.146 
This leaves an intentional killing standing as a murder.  We could 
stipulate that these elements do have a defensive role to play (e.g., 
mitigating factors), but we cannot stipulate that the prosecution will 
have an incentive to prove them.  In the company of an intentional 
killing amounting to murder, with no defensive role to play, the 
remaining elements in the prima facie case of provocation manslaughter 
are superfluous.  To say that they do have a mitigating role is to say—as 
I did, tongue in cheek, at the outset—that the prosecution must prove 
more than a murder if it wishes to convict the defendant of 
manslaughter.  In practice, the prosecution’s case for provocation 
manslaughter will always be a case for murder instead. 
 
146. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
07 -HUIGENS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  2:01 PM 
2011–2012] PROVOCATION AT FACE VALUE 459 
 
We might try to avoid this outcome by defining murder without 
reference to an intention to kill, thereby allowing it to rest on purely 
objective fault criteria such as malice or extreme indifference to the 
value of human life.  If our fault criteria for murder are objective 
features of the offense, then we have greater latitude to define 
provocation manslaughter in a way that will disprove a murder.  We 
might say, for example, that murder is a killing with malice and that heat 
of passion negates malice.  The prosecution’s proof of heat of passion, 
and its negating malice in the process, logically disproves murder.  But 
now we have two problems.  The prosecution has no incentive to negate 
malice, and the Constitution prohibits shifting the obligation to do so to 
the defense, because to do this is to require the defense to disprove an 
element of the offense.147 
We might eschew any formal connection between a homicide done 
in the heat of passion and a homicide done maliciously.  This would 
mean that proving heat of passion did not forestall murder by negating 
an element of murder, thereby avoiding constitutional objections.  This 
move works if provocation manslaughter is a defense, because proving a 
mitigating element that does not negate the offense element of malice 
does not give the jury the burden to disprove the prosecution’s case.148 
But this move will not work if provocation manslaughter is an 
offense—far from it.  It makes the offense of provocation manslaughter 
either incoherent, a violation of due process, or both.  Without a formal 
connection between murder and manslaughter, the proof of 
manslaughter will not disprove or otherwise forestall a murder 
conviction at all.  We will have defined the offense of provocation 
manslaughter in such a way that a jury’s finding that heat of passion has 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt does not logically defeat their 
prior finding that malice murder also has been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The prosecution’s case for provocation manslaughter 
is either a case for murder instead, or a delegation to the jury of 
complete discretion over the correct level of homicide, in law as well as 
in fact. 
The simplest way out of this serial dilemma seems to be to set aside 
the idea that the manslaughter must disprove the murder.  We should 
think in terms of precluding a murder conviction, as opposed to 
 
147. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701–04 (1975). 
148. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208–10 (1977). 
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disproving murder.  A rule of preclusion would solve the incentive 
problem.  Such a rule would stipulate that, once a prima facie proof of 
provocation manslaughter has been advanced, the jury cannot be 
instructed on murder and a murder verdict cannot be returned.  At this 
point, the prosecution could only make the case for manslaughter or 
remain silent.  If the prosecution remained silent, then there would be 
no conviction for murder or for manslaughter.  The rational prosecutor 
would do her best not to wind up without a conviction, by seeking to 
prove manslaughter, and the defendant would do his best to contest the 
state’s case for manslaughter and obtain an acquittal.  The incentives are 
now the right way around. 
One problem with this way out of our difficulties is that this rule of 
preclusion seems to merely stipulate away the murder—the kind of 
defect that I cited in my case against provocation as a defense.149  This is 
not necessarily fatal, however.  A rule of preclusion would still be more 
defensible than the day-into-night conversion of an offense to a defense.  
Generally speaking, a stipulation is content-independent; its rationale is 
unrelated to the underlying substance of the dispute.  If, however, a rule 
precluding a conviction for murder can be defended in terms of this 
normative logic, then it is not a mere stipulation.  It is a content-
dependent, principled rule.  A rule precluding a murder instruction 
might be this kind of rule. 
A more serious problem, however, is that a rule precluding a murder 
instruction based only on a prima facie case of provocation 
manslaughter would deprive the jury of its constitutional authority.  I 
have argued that provocation manslaughter logically excludes a murder 
just as a reckless manslaughter does.  But neither a prima facie case of 
reckless manslaughter nor a prima facie case of provocation 
manslaughter disproves murder.  If I admit that I knew the safety on my 
gun was off when I pointed it at my friend, but deny that I intended to 
kill him, then the jury obviously is entitled to resolve this factual dispute, 
and to decide whether the killing was reckless or intentional.  Likewise, 
if I admit that I intended to kill my wife’s lover, but insist that I was 
understandably overcome with rage when I did so, then the jury is 
entitled to decide what the truth of the matter is and should be 
instructed accordingly.  A rule precluding a murder conviction can be 
defended as a principled stipulation even if it does not rest on actual 
 
149. See discussion supra Part II. 
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disproof, but if the stipulation is triggered by only a prima facie case of 
provocation manslaughter, then it is likely to violate the Constitution’s 
guarantee of a jury trial in criminal cases.150  Presumably, most 
defendants would not object to the jury’s not having an opportunity to 
consider the murder charge, but the jury right is not personal to the 
defendant.151 
B.  How to Forestall a Murder Conviction 
We seem to be caught in a dilemma.  We have ample reason to think 
that provocation manslaughter is, conceptually, an offense, and we have 
normative reasons to treat it as one, if at all possible.  If we did this, then 
we would shift the burden of proving provoking circumstances onto the 
prosecution.  The problem is that the prosecution has no practical 
incentive to carry this burden.  On the contrary, the prosecution has 
ample incentive to lay back or sandbag the proof of provocation 
manslaughter in order to obtain a conviction for murder.  In order to 
solve the incentives problem, we need to forestall a murder conviction 
where provocation manslaughter is the proper verdict, but we cannot 
assume that provocation manslaughter is the proper verdict—which 
would be unconstitutional even if it were not question-begging. 
1. Regarding the Burden of Persuasion 
Within the normative system of criminal law, if a killing with intent 
is murder, then a killing with intent plus provoking circumstances is not 
murder.  This is apparent if we heed the distinctions I made in Part III.  
The intent to kill does not identify the same criminal fault as intent to 
kill in the context of provoking circumstances.  These are two different 
kinds of criminal fault, because fault is not a matter of intent elements, 
or even of intentional acts described in terms of objective circumstances.  
Criminal fault is, instead, a matter of intentions.  The intentional acts 
described in the definition of murder and the definition of provocation 
manslaughter are not the same as one another, regardless of whether the 
formal fault element of “intent” is mentioned in both.  Furthermore, the 
two offense definitions do not have the same implications for desert for 
 
150. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”). 
151. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34–36 (1965) (holding that a defendant has 
no absolute right to waive a jury trial). 
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legal punishment, because the different intentional acts they describe 
bring different intentions to bear on the question of desert. 
It is safe to say, then, that one who commits provocation 
manslaughter does not commit murder.  We can hardly say, however, 
that one who does not commit provocation manslaughter does not 
commit murder.  If a jury charged with deciding a case of provocation 
manslaughter were to acquit the defendant on this charge, and if it did 
so because the provoking circumstances element or elements had not 
been proved, then the jury rationally could find, and usually would find, 
that an intentional killing had taken place.  If the jury did find this, then 
the appropriate verdict would be murder.  The trick of finding a viable 
procedure for the proof of provocation manslaughter as an offense is to 
make room for the disproof of provocation manslaughter by the failure 
to find provoking circumstances, without, however, precluding a 
conviction for murder where an intentional killing has been proved.  It 
will not do, for example, simply to deny an instruction on murder if the 
prosecution fails to make a prima facie case of provocation 
manslaughter.  This certainly would encourage the prosecution to make 
every effort to prove provocation, but it could result in an acquittal in a 
case in which the evidence of provoking circumstances was very weak 
but the evidence of an intentional killing was very strong. 
The solution to the problem is to treat murder, as a procedural 
matter, as an included offense of provocation manslaughter on an 
analogy to the proof of lesser included offenses.  We should instruct the 
jury to consider and decide the charge of provocation manslaughter 
before it considers and decides the charge of murder.  This rule will 
serve our primary objective of forestalling a murder where provocation 
manslaughter is the better verdict.  Once the prosecution has made a 
prima facie showing of provocation manslaughter, the defense can 
bolster the case for provocation manslaughter in its portion of the 
trial.152  The prosecution will be free to offer evidence of non-
provocation in rebuttal, and to advocate against provocation 
manslaughter at the conclusion of the trial.  Given that the defense has, 
at this point, taken on the task, if not the burden, of persuading the jury 
that only a manslaughter was committed, the prosecution can contest 
this issue without creating confusion over whether it seeks a murder 
 
152. On the prosecution’s prima facie showing of provocation manslaughter, see infra 
Part IV.B.2. 
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conviction or a conviction on the manslaughter. 
When the jury retires, the state of the evidence will be such that the 
defendant will have a fair shot at a manslaughter conviction.  The 
argument that the jury should find the defendant guilty of no more than 
manslaughter will be presented in a perfectly logical fashion in the jury 
instructions, in spite of what the elements seem to imply about more and 
less grave offenses.  If the jury is told to consider the charge of 
provocation manslaughter before it considers the charge of murder, and 
to stop its deliberations if it finds the defendant guilty of the 
manslaughter, then (if it follows its instructions) the jury will issue a 
verdict of provocation manslaughter before it has an opportunity to 
convict the defendant of murder. 
If the case is one in which the evidence of provoking circumstances is 
weak and the evidence of an intentional killing is strong, then the jury 
will acquit the defendant of provocation manslaughter.  The jury will, at 
this point, proceed to consider the charge of murder.  If the evidence of 
an intentional killing is strong, then the jury will convict on this charge, 
and we will have avoided one troubling implication of taking 
provocation at face value.  This procedure is analogous to jury 
deliberations in a case charging a lesser included offense, in that the jury 
considers the including offense and then the included offense; although 
it differs from these cases, obviously, in that the jury considers the lesser 
degree offense before it considers the greater. 
If we take provocation manslaughter to be an offense, then what we 
end up with is murder as a greater included offense and provocation 
manslaughter as a lesser including offense.  Given the choice between 
following our usual procedure with respect to the greater–lesser 
relationship or with respect to the including–included relationship 
instead, we should give greater consideration to the latter relationship, 
and arrange the order of proof accordingly. 
Why is this so?  The principle of lenity requires it.  In its most 
familiar form, the principle of lenity is a rule of statutory construction 
that requires an ambiguous statute to be construed in the defendant’s 
favor, instead of, for example, interpreting it in light of legislative 
intent.153  But this rule of statutory construction is merely one 
application of a broader rule-of-law principle that also undergirds such 
 
153. See United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 264 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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features of the system as the presumption of innocence and proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.154  The defendant is entitled to be protected 
from the government’s unfair advantages in every respect.155  The 
proposed reversal of the order of deliberations on murder and 
provocation manslaughter is but another application of this fundamental 
principle.  If provocation manslaughter is proved as an offense, then the 
concessions that we ordinarily accord the prosecution as the proponent 
in a criminal case tip over into unfair advantage, resulting in perverse 
incentives.  A correction is called for, and inverting the order of 
deliberations in order to treat provocation as a lesser including offense 
provides it.  There is also a normative-theoretical reason to alter the 
usual order of proof, which is the simple fact that provocation 
manslaughter is an offense. 
a.  The Rule of Lenity, and Provocation Manslaughter as a Lesser 
Including Offense 
From the point of view of the rule of lenity, it is misleading to see the 
problem in terms of the prosecution’s incentives in the first place.  It is 
more instructive to frame the problem in terms of the unfair advantage 
that the prosecution has come to possess in the proof of this particular 
offense.  The rule of lenity requires us to maintain the same balance of 
powers in the trial of provocation manslaughter that obtains in other 
criminal cases, and this is best accomplished by instructing the jury to 
consider and decide the charge of provocation manslaughter before it 
considers the included charge of murder. 
Notice that the usual order in which offenses are considered is, in 
fact, a departure from the rule of lenity.  The jury considers the highest 
charged offense first, and ceases its deliberations if it finds that this 
 
154. See Don Stuart, Supporting General Principles for Criminal Responsibility in the 
Model Penal Code with Suggestions for Reconsideration: A Canadian Perspective, 4 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 13, 41 (2000) (“A commitment to the presumption of innocence and the 
concept of proof beyond reasonable doubt points to a return to strict construction or to what 
American writers call the principle of lenity.”); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Toward a 
Jurisprudence of Presumptions, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 907, 913 (1992) (“Saving constructions of 
statutes, for example, are thought to showcase judicial restraint, and the rule of lenity has its 
roots in due process and the presumption of innocence.” (footnote omitted)). 
155. See David A. Dana, Democratizing the Law of Federal Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. 507, 526 (2008) (“This canon of construction seems based on a fairness value regarding 
notice and the constitutional values that support a presumption of innocence and protections 
of criminal defendants against government overreaching.”). 
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offense has been committed.  This is to the advantage of the 
prosecution.  The jury has no opportunity to consider whether, all things 
considered, it might be better to convict the defendant of a lesser 
offense.  The rule of lenity—the requirement that, all things being equal, 
criminal law should be construed in favor of the defendant—arguably 
requires that the jury be given this opportunity.156 
Why is lenity usually denied here?  We deny the jury the opportunity 
to consider the lesser offense because we ordinarily have good reasons 
to depart from the rule of lenity in this regard.  At trial, the prosecution 
is entitled to put on its evidence first and then to offer evidence in 
rebuttal, because it is the proponent in the case.  We treat closing 
arguments in the same way: the prosecution leads off and also has the 
final word.  We grant the prosecution these advantages as a fair 
counterweight to its bearing the burden of persuasion on the offenses it 
has charged.  We usually order the jury’s deliberation on the several 
offenses charged from the highest to the lowest degree for the same 
reasons.  The proponent should be granted the full benefit of his success 
if he has succeeded in making the case that he set out to make.  After 
all, some consideration has already been granted to the defense in the 
charges themselves, because the prosecution has an ethical duty not to 
seek a conviction on any charge that it does not believe, in good faith, it 
can prove.157 
Furthermore, to permit the jury to consider the lesser offense after it 
has convicted on the greater seems to be an open invitation to jury 
nullification.  It would create the opportunity for the jury to convict on 
the lesser offense even if the lesser offense has not been proved, for 
reasons of sympathy or prejudice.  If the prosecution has proved the 
greatest offense that it could charge within the limits of its ethical 
obligations, then ordinarily it is both unfair and unwise to take back a 
portion of what the prosecution has fairly won, so to speak, by 
 
156. See Dauray, 215 F.3d at 264 (“In criminal prosecutions the rule of lenity requires 
that ambiguities in the statute be resolved in the defendant’s favor.” (citations omitted)). 
157. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2009) (“The prosecutor in a 
criminal case shall . . . refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not 
supported by probable cause . . . .”); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.9(a) (1986) 
(“It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to institute, or cause to be instituted, or to 
permit the continued pendency of criminal charges when it is known that the charges are not 
supported by probable cause.  A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or 
permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible 
evidence to support a conviction.”). 
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permitting the jury to consider lesser charges after it has convicted the 
defendant on the greater charge. 
When it comes to proving provocation manslaughter, however, we 
have a compelling counterweight to these reasons—one that should 
cause us to come down on the side of lenity, and to give the defense a 
fair shot at a manslaughter conviction.  The justification for denying the 
prosecution its usual advantages rests on the perverse incentives that 
those advantages produce.  The prosecution does not have the option of 
sandbagging in the proof of other homicide cases, and there is no 
plausible moral justification for its having this option in cases in which 
there is good evidence of provocation manslaughter. 
One might object that it would not have these advantages if we left 
well enough alone and continued to treat provocation as a defense.  But 
if provocation manslaughter is an offense as a conceptual matter, and if 
the normative theory of punishment requires us to treat it as such as a 
practical matter of positive law, then these perverse incentives are not 
merely the consequences of a novel proposal.  They are features of 
provocation manslaughter as it has come to operate in the context of 
modern, constitutionally required procedures for proof of offenses.  
Regardless of how history put the law in this contradictory posture, we 
are required to regularize it.  Reversing the order of deliberations, from 
lesser offense to greater is a conservative way to effect this resolution. 
b.  Provocation Manslaughter and Normative Legal Theory 
Regarding the theoretical reason to reverse the order of 
deliberations, it is important to bear in mind that the theory that proves 
that provocation manslaughter is an offense as a conceptual matter is a 
normative theory of legal punishment.  This is important because it is in 
the nature of a normative legal theory to require the practical 
implementation of its conclusions. 
The difference between descriptive punishment theory and 
normative punishment theory can only be sketched here.  Suffice it to 
say that a normative theory of legal punishment makes two fundamental 
assumptions.  The first of these is that a correct description of legal 
punishment is a description of just punishment, because justice 
supervenes158 on law or because law is a reductive description of 
 
158. Supervenience is a relationship of asymmetrical co-variance.  MICHAEL S. MOORE, 
CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS 42 
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justice.159  The second assumption is that if we have described legal 
punishment correctly, then this is itself a reason to make the positive law 
conform to this description.  In technical terms, normative punishment 
theory assumes that reasons are internal to descriptions of norms. 
The second assumption of normative legal theorizing, reasons 
internalism, is the more important one here.160  For the internalist, a 
belief about morality provides a reason to put that belief into action, so 
that we ought to act on the belief if we are to act rationally.161  For an 
externalist, in contrast, our beliefs and our reasons are two different 
things.  We behave rationally if we believe that an action is morally 
required, and yet do not take that action.162  For example, on an 
externalist view, we can reach the conclusion that the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines are unjust, and then rationally ignore this fact and go on 
imposing unjust sentences.  An internalist denies that this is rational.  If 
we reach the conclusion that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are 
unjust, then we have reasons to change our sentencing practices by 
altering or abolishing this unjust law.  We ought to change our 
sentencing law because it would be not only immoral or unjust, but also 
irrational to go on imposing sentences under it. 
 
(2009).  Asymmetrical co-variance means that any change in the properties of A requires 
changes in the properties of B, but not vice-versa.  So if moral rightness supervenes on some 
social practice, then a change in rightness entails a change in what is right in that practice; but 
a change in our practices does not imply a change in what is right.  For example, the principle 
of right requires us to punish only the deserving, and we might impose a constitutional bar on 
strict liability offenses for this reason.  If new social circumstances create a need for increased 
deterrence, so that it is right to impose strict liability, then we ought to impose strict liability.  
Merely to impose strict liability, in contrast, could not make it right to do so.  Supervenience 
is one way to understand realism in morals and ethics.  In debating the justice or injustice of 
strict liability, most of us assume that the question is whether there has been a shift in what is 
right.  Few of us take the question to be whether we should shift what is right by imposing 
strict liability. 
159. A reductive description of A is a description of A in terms of B, C, D, etc., to the 
exclusion of A.  For example, some scholars purport to give a reductive explanation of 
negligence liability, (A), in terms of efficient uses, (B), transaction costs, (C), and 
externalities, (D), to the exclusion of such negligence concepts as the reasonable person or 
corrective justice.  See, e.g., Seth D. Harris, Coase’s Paradox and the Inefficiency of Permanent 
Strike Replacements, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1185, 1190–94 (2002) (summarizing Ronald Coase’s 
explanation of tort rules in terms of economic efficiency). 
160. See MICHAEL SMITH, THE MORAL PROBLEM 71–76 (1994). 
161. See id. at 72 (explaining that an internalist believes that one’s actions are directly 
based on a person’s “moral judgment itself”). 
162. See id. at 71–76 (explaining that an externalist believes that actions are based on a 
person’s motivations, not his moral judgment). 
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The conceptual argument that I advanced above in Parts II and III is 
a normative legal theory that assumes reasons internalism.  On this 
assumption, the descriptive conceptual account of provocation 
manslaughter obligates us, on pain of irrationality, to make provocation 
work as an offense.  I have described how we can do this with respect to 
the burden of persuasion.  It remains to describe an effective, defensible 
procedure for the burden of production. 
2. Regarding the Burden of Production 
Even assuming that one accepts my argument so far, the prosecution 
has no more incentive to make a prima facie case of provocation 
manslaughter than it ordinarily has to persuade the jury that this is the 
crime that the defendant committed.  The reversal of the order of 
deliberations cannot help us here—it has not yet come into play.  In 
addition to this incentives problem, there is a second practical problem.  
The defendant, not the prosecution, has the best evidence of 
provocation—a critical concern where the burden of production is 
concerned.  This problem should not be overstated, because in many 
cases most of the evidence of provocation will be known at the start of 
the investigation.  Even so, it would be unfair and unwise to impose the 
burden of production on the prosecution without guaranteeing, in some 
fashion, that it has in its possession every available piece of evidence in 
support of provocation manslaughter. 
A third concern is the fact that the prosecution has the ability and 
incentive to sandbag the proof of provocation manslaughter so that no 
instruction on it would be justified.  This is especially a danger where the 
evidence of provoking circumstances is weak.  In this case, the only 
homicide that the jury would be instructed on would be murder, even 
though the case was at least arguably one of manslaughter, and the jury 
should have had the opportunity so to find.  Finally, the prosecution 
might fail to make a prima facie case in spite of its best efforts to do so.  
Even if it has all of the evidence of provocation in its possession, the 
evidence that exists might simply be insufficient to make such a case, 
even if the prosecution makes a good faith effort. 
This fourth problem is no problem at all, of course.  If the 
prosecution has failed to make a prima facie case of provocation 
manslaughter when there seemed to be sufficient evidence to do so, and 
if that failure was a good faith failure, then no instruction on 
provocation manslaughter should be given.  The apparently sufficient 
evidence simply turned out to be insufficient. 
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The second problem, the possibility that the prosecution will not 
have the necessary evidence in its possession, is not much of a 
problem.163  It can be solved with a rule requiring the defendant to 
provide this discovery.164  The Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination 
Clause protects the defendant from being compelled to make 
incriminating statements, but this is not a general privilege not to 
provide discovery.165  Specifically, the defendant can be compelled to 
produce investigative reports and defense witness statements if the 
prosecution needs them in order to respond to the defendant’s case.166  If 
a defendant were to offer proof of provocation manslaughter in his own 
defense, the prosecution ordinarily would be entitled to the discovery of 
this evidence.  If, as proposed here, the prosecution is assigned the 
burden of production on provocation manslaughter, then it will need to 
receive this discovery before the defense puts on its case.  To require the 
defendant to provide pre-trial discovery in anticipation of its putting on 
a particular case does not violate the Fifth Amendment, even if this 
discovery requirement effectively accelerates the timing of the 
defendant’s strategic decision-making.167 
The remaining two problems—the prosecution’s having no incentive 
to prove provocation manslaughter and its opportunity to fail to make a 
prima facie case in bad faith—can be solved by combining the rule that 
reverses the order of deliberations with the discovery rule, in this way: 
The defense may request the special order of proof for provocation 
manslaughter in a motion at the end of the state’s case.  Its right to make 
this motion, however, is conditioned on its providing pre-trial notice of its 
intention to make the motion, and on the disclosure to the prosecution of 
all evidence of provocation in its possession when the notice is given, and 
thereafter. 
Absent some proof that he has not produced all available evidence 
of provocation, the defendant will be allowed to move to reverse the 
order of deliberations.  This motion, of course, entails a request for an 
instruction on provocation manslaughter.  Having made the prima facie 
 
163. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233–34 (1975). 
164. See id. 
165. See id. 
166. See id. 
167. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85–86 (1970) (“Nothing in the Fifth 
Amendment privilege [against self-incrimination] entitles a defendant . . . to await the end of 
the State’s case before announcing the nature of his defense . . . .”). 
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case, it would be odd if the prosecution opposed the trial court’s giving 
the instruction on provocation manslaughter, but we would expect the 
prosecution to oppose the defense motion to reverse the order of 
deliberations.  This, however, comes to the same thing.  If a jury in a 
good case of provocation manslaughter considers murder first, then it 
will find murder was committed, and cease deliberations, making the 
provocation instruction moot.  Given that to deny the reversal of 
deliberations is to deny any meaningful instruction on provocation 
manslaughter, the only sensible standard by which to govern the motion 
to reverse deliberations is the same sufficiency of the evidence standard 
that governs the decision whether to instruct on an offense.  If a rational 
jury could find provocation manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt, 
then the order of deliberations should be reversed.  In other words, the 
order of deliberations should be reversed in all cases of provocation 
manslaughter that go to the jury. 
This hardly solves our problems with perverse incentives and bad 
faith.  Because reversing the order of deliberations facilitates the proof 
of provocation manslaughter, it reinforces the prosecutor’s reasons not 
to make a prima facie case.  From one perspective, however, it changes 
the incentives and bad faith calculation fundamentally: it gives the trial 
court the power to dismiss the case with prejudice if the prosecution fails 
to make a prima facie case of provocation manslaughter where there 
was sufficient evidence to do so.  The trial court ordinarily has no reason 
to treat the prosecution’s failure to make a prima facie case as 
prosecutorial misconduct, because the prosecution has no obligation to 
make a prima facie case to begin with.  In the situation that concerns us 
here, however, the question is not only whether the case should go to 
the jury.  It is whether the prosecution has done what it is obligated to 
do, and whether it has done it in good faith.  If it has failed to make a 
prima facie case and has done so in bad faith, then we are justified in 
treating this failure as cause for a dismissal with prejudice. 
The key to this procedure, the counter-incentive to the perverse 
incentives of the prosecution, is the threat of a mistrial and a bar to 
retrial under the law of double jeopardy.168  A trial court has the 
discretion to declare a mistrial and permit the prosecution to retry the 
case if the mistrial is a manifest necessity.169  A mistrial granted because 
 
168. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 466, 471 (1973). 
169. See id. at 459 (holding double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial of an indictment 
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of prosecutorial misconduct is not a manifest necessity, and retrial is 
barred even if the defense makes the motion for a mistrial.170  In a case 
in which it is arguable that sufficient evidence of provoking 
circumstances exists, the prosecution’s failure to make a prima facie case 
of provocation manslaughter is a ground for mistrial that does not 
constitute manifest necessity.  The prosecutorial misconduct consists of 
exploiting the perverse incentives that would otherwise make it 
necessary to put the burden of proving manslaughter on the defense, in 
contravention of the fundamental values of lenity and the proof of 
offenses by the state. 
If the evidence of an intent to kill in the case is very strong, then the 
effective acquittal of the defendant by means of a dismissal and bar to 
retrial is obviously undesirable.  However, it is important to recognize 
that the only cases in which this will happen will be cases of a gross 
failure by the prosecution to prove provocation manslaughter where it 
has sufficient evidence of provoking circumstances available to it.  In 
practice, the adequacy of a prima facie case is almost always a question 
on which reasonable minds might differ.  It seems fair to assume that the 
prosecution will always make enough of a showing to conceal its bad 
faith, and that in doing so it is likely to present a case that is strong 
enough to bring it within the range of discretion that is ordinarily 
exercised in determining whether to instruct on a given offense.  We 
cannot expect the prosecution to do more than this, but the prospect of 
a dismissal with prejudice will be sufficient to guarantee that it does not 
do less.  Otherwise, if the prosecution’s sandbagging were blatant, then 
its misconduct would be plain, and a dismissal with prejudice would be 
fully justified.   
Under the procedure I propose, the question of whether there has 
been prosecutorial misconduct will turn on whether the prosecution has 
made adequate use of the evidence at its disposal.  The fact that the 
defense has a discovery obligation makes this a fair question.  The fact 
that the adequacy of the defendant’s disclosures is presented for a 
determination at the same time and under the same standard as the 
sufficiency of the prosecution’s prima facie case makes possible a fair 
 
that was dismissed because it was inadequate but could not be amended, because the 
dismissal was a manifest necessity). 
170. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679 (1982) (holding double jeopardy clause 
bars retrial where the prosecution provokes the defense into moving for a mistrial). 
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answer to this question.  Notice, furthermore, that the way in which 
these rules preclude a murder conviction does not infringe upon the 
province of the jury.  Assuming that my theoretical analysis is correct, a 
murder conviction will be precluded only if the evidence is insufficient 
to support a verdict of murder.  That is, it will be precluded only if the 
evidence is sufficient to support a verdict of provocation manslaughter, 
and if the jury does find provocation manslaughter beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Having found provocation manslaughter, they will cease 
deliberations before they consider murder, but of course this is as it 
should be.  A verdict of provocation manslaughter means that murder 
has been disproved. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
For historical reasons that I have not addressed, a gap developed 
between the correct normative-theoretical description of provocation 
manslaughter and modern proof procedures under court rules and 
constitutional law.  The accepted solution to this conflict between theory 
and practice is to convert provocation manslaughter into a defense.  This 
is, constitutionally, an evasion of responsibility and, theoretically, an 
implausible day-into-night conversion unlike anything else ever 
attempted in criminal law or, indeed, in law generally. 
I have argued that provocation manslaughter is an offense as a 
conceptual matter, and my working assumption has been that we are 
committed to abiding by the constitutional principle of proof of criminal 
offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.  The upshot of this argument and 
assumption is that provocation manslaughter ought to be pled and 
proved as an offense.  The prosecution should carry both the burden of 
production and the burden of persuading the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a particular, carefully defined kind of homicide has been 
committed.  To do anything less is to fail to take the crime seriously and 
to give both the victim and the offender less than their due.  The 
morality of criminal law requires us to treat any homicide with a level of 
care sufficient to determine the true gravity of the harm done to the 
victim and the true level of the offender’s desert for punishment, and to 
do this in a way that does not suggest that the kind of homicide suffered 
by the victim and perpetrated by the offender is a lesser kind of crime. 
We should adopt rules substantially similar to the following: In a 
prosecution for murder, the prosecution is required to raise a prima facie 
case of provocation manslaughter if sufficient evidence of this offense is 
available to it.  If the prosecution has made a prima facie case of 
07 -HUIGENS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  2:01 PM 
2011–2012] PROVOCATION AT FACE VALUE 473 
 
provocation manslaughter, then the jury should be instructed to consider 
this charge before it considers the charge of murder.  If the jury convicts 
the defendant of provocation manslaughter, then it should cease 
deliberating and issue a verdict finding the defendant guilty of that crime.  
If the jury acquits the defendant of provocation manslaughter, or if it fails 
to reach a verdict on that crime, then it should proceed to consider and 
decide whether the defendant committed murder.  The defense may 
invoke the special order of proof for provocation manslaughter in a 
motion at the end of the state’s case.  Its right to make this motion, 
however, is conditioned on its providing pre-trial notice of its intention to 
make the motion, and on the disclosure to the prosecution of all evidence 
of provocation in its possession when the notice is given, and thereafter. 
This procedure is a less radical solution to our difficulties than the 
conversion of an offense into a defense, and it far better preserves 
criminal law’s constitutional principles, theoretical consistency, and 
moral integrity. 
